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I. Introduction
Without much public debate the Treaty of Lisbon1 inserted Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) into the existing framework of a broadened Common Commercial Policy (CCP).
Article 206 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)2 now
provides in a programmatic fashion:
By establishing a customs union in accordance with Articles 28 to 32, the Union
shall contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world
trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and on foreign
direct investment, and the lowering of customs and other barriers.
Article 207(1) TFEU is the central provision regarding the EU’s competence in the
field of the CCP. It expressly lists various aspects of the CCP, now adding FDI matters to
the treaty-making power:
The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly
with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements
relating to trade in goods and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual
property, foreign direct investment, the achievement of uniformity in measures of
liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken
in the event of dumping or subsidies. The common commercial policy shall be
conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external
action.
As regards FDI matters to be negotiated and concluded under the new CCP, Article
207(4) first subparagraph TFEU provides for a special unanimity requirement:
For the negotiation and conclusion of the agreements referred to in paragraph 3,
the Council shall act by a qualified majority. For the negotiation and conclusion of
agreements in the fields of trade in services and the commercial aspects of
intellectual property, as well as foreign direct investment, the Council shall act
unanimously where such agreements include provisions for which unanimity is
required for the adoption of internal rules.
These provisions correspond largely to the proposals that were already discussed
during the drafting of a Constitution Treaty.3 Even then it was suggested that FDI
should be added to the existing external trade powers, comprising trade in goods, services
and intellectual property rights along the WTO-determined enlarged trade issues after
the Uruguay Round.4 While the extension to investment issues received some vigorous

1.
2.
3.
4.
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Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 of 17 December 2007.
Consolidated Version of The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 15, May 9,
2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1.
See TERENCE P. STEWART, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND (1993); JOHN KRAUS, THE GATT
NEGOTIATIONS (1994); ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN TRADE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND (1996); ARTHUR DUNKEL, JAGDISH BHAGWATI
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rejection by high-level state negotiators,5 the matter did not appear to have attracted
further attention during the subsequent negotiations. Also when the question of the
enlargement of the EU’s external trade powers was revived during the Lisbon Treaty
negotiations, investment seemed to have received no particular attention.

II. The Scope of the New Investment Powers of the EU Under an
Enlarged CCP
When EU Member States realized that the EU had gained a broad new investment
competence as a result of the express inclusion of FDI into the treaty-making powers
relating to the CCP, many of them tried to defend the remaining powers which they had
enjoyed so far as part of their national investment protection policies. This also led to a
lively academic debate about the scope of the new EU investment powers.6

5.

6.

& MATHIAS HIRSCH, THE URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND (1998); WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
GUIDE
TO
THE
URUGUAY
ROUND
AGREEMENTS
(1998);
GILBERT
WINHAM,
AN INTERPRETATIVE HISTORY OF THE URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATION (2005); ERNEST PREEG, THE
URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS AND THE CREATION OF THE WTO (2012).
See French, German, and other objections: MONSIEUR DE VILLEPIN, PROPOSITION D’AMENDEMENT
III-212,
available
at
http://europeanÀ
L’ARTICLE
convention.eu.int/docs/treaty/pdf/866/Art%20III%20212%20de%20Villepin%20FR.pdf;
JOSCHKA
FISCHER, SUGGESTION FOR AMENDMENT OF ARTICLE 24, CONV 685/03, available at
http://european-convention.eu.int/Docs/Treaty/pdf/866/Art24Fischer.pdf;
DAVID
HEATHCOATAMORY, SUGGESTION FOR AMENDMENT OF ARTICLE 24, available at http://europeanconvention.eu.int/Docs/Treaty/pdf/866/Art24Heathcoat-Amory%20EN.pdf.
Existing literature on the various aspects of the new EU investment powers is already vast. See,
e.g., Tillmann R. Braun, For a Complementary European Investment Protection, EUR. Y.B. OF INT’L
ECON. L. (SPECIAL ISSUE: INT’L INVESTMENT L. AND EU L. ) 95 (2011); Colin Brown & Maria
Alcover-Llubia, The external investment policy of the European Union in the light of the entry into
force of the Treaty of Lisbon, YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 3 (2012);
Markus Burgstaller, European Law and Investment Treaties, 26 J. OF INT’L ARB. 181 (2009);
Markus Burgstaller, Vertical Allocation of Competences for Investment Treaties in the European
Union, in MULTILATERALISM AND REGIONALISM IN GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: TRADE,
INVESTMENT AND FINANCE 125-138 (Junji Nakagawa ed., 2011); Marc Bungenberg, Jörn Griebel &
Steffen Hindelang eds., EUR. Y.B. OF INT’L ECON. L. (SPECIAL ISSUE: INT’L INVESTMENT L. AND EU
L.) (2011); Marc Bungenberg, The Division of Competences between the EU and Its Member States
in the Area of Investment Politics, EUR. Y.B. OF INT’L ECON. L. (SPECIAL ISSUE: INT’L INVESTMENT L.
AND EU L.) 29 (2011); Marc Bungenberg, Going Global? The EU Common Commercial Policy After
Lisbon, EUR. Y.B. OF INT’L ECON. L. 123 (2010); Marc Bungenberg, Außenbeziehungen und
Außenhandelspolitik, EUR BEIHEFT 195 (2009); Marc Bungenberg, The Politics of the European
Union’s Investment Treaty-Making, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 133
(Tomer Broude, Marc L. Busch & Amelia Porges eds., 2011); N. Jansen Calamita, The Making of
Europe’s International Investment Policy: Uncertain First Steps, 39 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON.
INTEGRATION 301 (2012); Jan Ceyssens, Towards a Common Foreign Investment Policy? – Foreign
Investment in the European Constitution, 32 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 259 (2005);
Julien Chaisse, Promises and Pitfalls of the European Union Policy on Foreign Investment – How
will the new EU Competence on FDI affect the emerging global regime?, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 51
(2012); Anna De Luca, New developments on the scope of the EU Common Commercial policy
under the Lisbon Treaty: Investment liberalization vs. investment protection, Y.B. ON INT’L
INVESTMENT L. & POL’Y 165 (2012); ANGELOS DIMOPOULOS, EU FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW (2011);
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Angelos Dimopoulos, The Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon: Establishing Parallelism
between Internal and External Economic Relations?, 4 CROATIAN Y.B. OF EUR. L. & POL’Y 101
(2008); Angelos Dimopoulos, The Compatibility of Future EU Investment Agreements with EU
Law, 39 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 447 (2012); DIRK EHLERS, HANSMICHAEL WOLFFGANG, & ULRICH JAN SCHRÖDER, Bilaterale und regionale Handelsabkommen als
Kernstück der “neuen” EG-Handelspolitik, in RECHTSFRAGEN INTERNATIONALER INVESTITIONEN :
TAGUNGSBAND ZUM 13, 211 (2009); Thomas Eilmansberger, Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU
Law, 46 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 383 (2009); Adrian Emch, News from Luxembourg – Is the New
EU Investment Law Taking Shape?,, 9 J. OF WORLD INVESTMENT AND TRADE 497 (2008); Jörn
Griebel, Überlegungen zur Wahrnehmung der neuen EU-Kompetenz für ausländische
Direktinvestitionen nach Inkrafttreten des Vertrags von Lissabon, RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN
WIRTSCHAFT 469 (2009); Christoph Hermann, Die Zukunft der mitgliedstaatlichen
Investitionspolitik nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, 77 EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 207 (2010); Steffen Hindelang & Niklas Maydell, The EU’s Common
Investment Policy – Connecting the Dots, EUR. Y.B. OF INT’L ECON. L. (SPECIAL ISSUE: INT’L
INVESTMENT L. AND EU L.) 1 (2011); F. Hoffmeister & G. Ünüvar, From BITS and Pieces towards
European Investment Agreements, in EU AND INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: OPEN QUESTIONS AND
REMAINING CHALLENGES 57 (Marc Bungenberg, August Reinisch & Christian Tietje eds., 2013);
Sven Johannsen, Die Kompetenz der Europäischen Union für ausländische Direktinvestititonen
nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, 90 BEITRÄGE ZUM TRANSNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (2009);
J. Karl, The Competence for Foreign Direct Investment: New Powers for the European Union?, 5 J.
OF WORLD INVESTMENT AND TRADE 413 (2004); Marcus Klamert & Niklas Maydell, Lost in
Exclusivity: Implied Non-Exclusive External Competences in Community Law, 13 EUR. FOREIGN
AFF. REV. 493 (2008); Jan Kleinheisterkamp, The Future of the BITs of European Member States
after Lisbon, 29 ASA BULL. 212 (2011); Markus Krajewski, External Trade Law and the
Constitution Treaty: Towards a Federal and More Democratic Common Commercial Policy?, 42
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 91 (2005); Pieter Jan Kujper, Foreign Direct Investment: The First Test of
the Lisbon Improvements in the Domain of Trade Polity, 37 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION
261 (2010); Lars Markert, The Crucial Question of Future Investment Treaties: Balancing
Investors’ Rights and Regulatory Interests of Host States, EUR. Y.B. OF INT’L ECON. L. (SPECIAL
ISSUE: INT’L INVESTMENT L. AND EU L.) 145 (2011); Niklas Maydell, The European Community’s
Minimum Platform on Investment or the Trojan Horse of Investment Competence, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW IN CONTEXT 73 (August Reinisch & Christina Knahr eds.,
2008); Carsten Nowak, Legal Arrangements for the Promotion and Protection of Foreign
Investments Within the Framework of the EU Association Policy and European Neighbourhood
Policy, EUR. Y.B. OF INT’L ECON. L. (SPECIAL ISSUE: INT’L INVESTMENT L. AND EU L.) 105 (2011);
Federico Ortino & Piet Eeckhout, Towards and EU Policy on Foreign Direct Investment, in EU
LAW AFTER LISBON 312 (Andrea Biondi et al. eds., 2011); August Reinisch, The Division of Powers
between the EU and its Member States “After Lisbon,” EUR. Y.B. OF INT’L ECON. L. (SPECIAL ISSUE:
INT’L INVESTMENT L. AND EU L.) 43 (2011); Mavluda Sattorova, Return to the Local Remedies Rule
in European BITs? Power (Inequalities), Dispute Settlement, and Change in Investment Treaty
Law, 39 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 223 (2012); Wenhua Shan, Towards a Common
European Community Policy on Investment Issues, 2 J. OF WORLD INVESTMENT AND TRADE 603
(2001); Wenhua Shan & Sheng Zhang, The Treaty of Lisbon: Half Way toward a Common
Investment Policy, 21 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 1049 (2010); Jörg Philipp Terhechte, Art. 351 TFEU, the
Principle of Loyalty and the Future Role of the Member States’ Bilateral Investment Treaties, EUR.
Y.B. OF INT’L ECON. L. (SPECIAL ISSUE: INT’L INVESTMENT L. AND EU L.) 79 (2011); Christian Tietje,
Die Außenwirtschaftsverfassung der EU nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, 83 BEITRÄGE ZUM
TRANSNATIONALEN
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT
(2009);
Christian
Tietje,
Bilaterale
Investitionsschutzverträge zwischen EU-Mitgliedstaaten (Intra-EU-BITs) als Herausforderung im
Mehrebenensystem des Rechts, 104 BEITRÄGE ZUM TRANSNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (2011);
Stephen Woolcock, The potential impact of the Lisbon Treaty on EU External Trade policy, 8
SIEPS – EUROPEAN POLICY ANALYSIS (2008).
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On the one hand, it was argued that the EU’s investment powers would be limited to
aspects concerning the admission of investments and not extend to traditional
investment protection once an investment was made.7 On the other hand, the express
choice of the term FDI was interpreted as limiting the EU’s powers to FDI, excluding
portfolio investments traditionally covered by modern investment treaties.8 Both
limitations would lead to a situation of de facto shared control between the EU and its
Member States, as they would require the conclusion of so-called mixed agreements to be
negotiated and concluded by both the EU and its Member States.9 Thus, the question
was everything but “academic.”
This limiting interpretation of the new investment powers of the EU was supported by
valid arguments. The EU’s and earlier the EC’s CCP powers were traditionally aimed at
reducing obstacles to international trade in order to pursue its trade liberalization credo.
Previous enlargements of the CCP in the field of services were interpreted restrictively
by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), limiting the EC’s power to the cross-border
(trade equivalent) mode of supply in the language of the GATS.10 And traditionally, the
EC/EU acted in the field of investment only as regards liberalization and
access/admission rules, as was evident in the so-called Minimum Platform on
Investment,11 as well as ensuing trade negotiations with third countries that
incorporated investment liberalization, but excluded post-establishment investment
protection.12 This limiting interpretation could also find support in the language of the

7.
8.
9.

10.

11.

12.

See Bungenberg, The Division of Competences between the EU and Its Member States in the Area
of Investment Politics, supra note 6, at 29.
See the Lisbon Treaty judgment of the German Constitutional Court, infra note 130.
See Ramses Wessel, The EU as a Party to International Agreements: Shared Competences, Mixed
Responsibilities, in LAW AND PRACTICE OF EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS: SALIENT FEATURES OF A
CHANGING LANDSCAPE 152 (Alan Dashwood & Marc Maresceau eds., 2008). See also THE
GENERAL LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS (Alan Dashwood & Christophe Hillion eds., 2000);
MIXED AGREEMENTS REVISITED: THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES IN THE WORLD (Christophe
Hillion & Panos Koutrakos eds., 2010).
See Opinion 1/94, Competence of the Community to conclude international agreements concerning
services and the protection of intellectual property, ECJ, ECR I-5267 (November 15, 1994) and the
subsequent enlargements of the CCP by the Amsterdam and Nice Amendments to the EC Treaty.
Cf. generally Piet Eeckhout, EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: LEGAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2004).
Note by the General Secretariat: Minimum Platform on Investment for EU FTAs, 15375/06,
(Nov.27, 2006) (unpublished); Based on Commission to the Council the European Union, Note
for the Attention of the 133 Committee, “Minimum Platform on Investment for EU FTAs –
Provisions on Establishment in Template for a Title on “Establishment, Trade in Services and
E-commerce,” MD 381/06, (July 28, 2006). The content was considered confidential by the
Council and never officially published. Requests for documents release by scholars were
regularly denied. See N. Jansen Calamita, The Making of Europe’s International Investment
Policy: Uncertain First Steps, supra note 6, at 305 n.19. For details of the content of the
Minimum Platform see, however, Niklas Maydell, The European Community’s Minimum
Platform on Investment or the Trojan Horse of Investment Competence, supra note 6.
See Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part,
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Lisbon Treaty amendments, in particular Article 206 TFEU which speaks of the
“progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and on foreign direct
investment”, suggesting that the CCP is primarily concerned with access/admission
aspects. By comparison Article 207(1) TFEU is more ambiguously worded. Its reference
to the “conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services,
and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, […]” can
be read as support of the limiting interpretation if one understands that “foreign direct
investment” is the other subject-matter “the commercial aspects of” which may be
addressed in CCP treaties. However, it is equally plausible to consider that “foreign
direct investment” is the third field of “trade agreements” the EU may enter into, after
those “relating to trade in goods and services” and those relating to “the commercial
aspects of intellectual property.”
Not surprisingly, it is this latter reading which the EU Commission vigorously adopts.
The Commission considers that the EU’s investment power is not limited to the
access/admission questions regarding investments. Rather, it comprises both the preestablishment as well as the post-establishment phase and would thus allow the EU to
conclude treaties containing the traditional substantive treatment obligations of IIAs and
procedural guarantees in the form of state-to-state and investor-to-state dispute
settlement (ISDS), albeit in the adapted version of allowing the EU to (partly) replace its
Member States as respondent.13 The EU Commission equally rejects a narrow reading of
its investment powers as powers limited to FDI. Though the wording, and thus the
“ordinary meaning”, of the TFEU appears to be clear, the Commission in particular
asserts that the EU’s investment power also includes an implied power concerning
portfolio investments.14
A separate but related issue is the question of whether the new investment power of
the EU implies that BITs between Member States have become incompatible with EU
Law and may have to be terminated.15 While the Commission has clearly expressed this
view,16 investment tribunals have generally upheld their jurisdiction based on the
continued validity of so-called intra-EU-BITs.17

13.
14.
15.
16.

17.
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and the Republic of Korea, of the other part, May 14, 2011, art. 7(10), n.14, O.J. (L 127) 6,
expressly stating that investment protection is not covered by the section on establishment.
See infra text accompanying note 97.
See infra text accompanying note 125.
See infra text accompanying note 179.
See EC Letter of January 13, 2006, quoted in Eastern Sugar BV v. Czech Republic, SCC Case No.
088/2004, Partial Award, at ¶ 19, (Arb. Inst. Of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 2007);
European Commission Observations, July 7, 2010, quoted in Eureko BV v. The Slovak Republic,
PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, at ¶ 180 (Oct. 26,
2010).
Eastern Sugar v. Czech Republic, supra note 16; Eureko BV v. The Slovak Republic, supra note
16; see also Czech Republic v. Eureko, OLG Frankfurt, Case No. 26 SchH 11/10, Order (May 10,
2012).

The EU on the Investment Path

III.The Start of the Debate on Future EU IIAs
As outlined above, the immediate aftermath of the entry-into-force of the Lisbon
Treaty was dominated by the debate between the EU Commission and the EU Member
States on the appropriate division of their respective powers in the field of investment.
Much time and effort was spent on both sides to claim and to defend treaty-making
powers as regards IIAs with third states that may have prevented them to devote
sufficient energy to the fashioning of a new investment policy of the Union. The official
and publicly available documents in this direction are still rather limited.
In July 2010, two Commission documents were made public. One was a Draft
Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing transitional
arrangements for bilateral investment treaties between Member States and third
countries (“grandfathering regulation”);18 the other a Communication outlining the
future EU investment policy.19 This was followed by a Commission proposal in summer
2012 on a regulation addressing the issue of allocating financial responsibility between
the EU and its Member States in case of investment arbitration.20
As of December 2012, only the “grandfathering regulation” has been adopted.21 The
long time required for its adoption may be explained by the contentious debate
surrounding the modalities of the core authorization mechanism it contains. The
underlying problem is easy to describe. If and to the extent that the EU has acquired an
exclusive competence over investment matters, such shift of powers leads to a
corresponding loss of powers on the part of the Member States. As a consequence,
existing Member State BITs become “unconstitutional” under EU law. Of course, this
does not automatically affect their validity under international law but from the
perspective of EU law the exclusive CCP power implies that only the EU can lawfully

18.

19.

20.

21.

Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council
establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment treaties between Member States
and third countries, COM(2010) 344 final (July 7, 2010), [hereinafter Commission Proposal
2010], available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/july/tradoc_146308.pdf.
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Towards a comprehensive
European international investment policy, COM(2010) 343 final (July 7, 2010), [hereinafter
2010
Commission
Communication],
available
at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/july/tradoc_146307.pdf.
Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
establishing a framework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-state dispute
settlement tribunals established by international agreements to which the European Union is
party,
COM
(2012)
335
final
(July
21,
2012);
available
at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/june/tradoc_149567.pdf.
Regulation No. 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2012
Establishing Transitional Arrangements for Bilateral Investment Treaties Between Member
States and Third Countries, O.J. (L 351) 40.
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enter into and be a partner to treaties with third countries addressing subject-matter
covered by the CCP.
Since this “loss” of Member State powers took effect with the entry-into-force of the
Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, a quick pragmatic solution had to be found. In fact,
EU law permits the Union to authorize the Member States to act in fields of its own
exclusive powers.22 Such an authorization is now contained in the recently adopted
grandfathering regulation. Already before its adoption, the Commission had informally
signalled to its Member States that it would consent to their continued negotiation and
conclusion of BITs with third states.
The initial Commission draft regulation intended to set out “the terms, conditions and
the procedure under which Member States are authorised to maintain in force, amend or
conclude bilateral agreements with third countries relating to investment.”23 Such
authorization should have been given as a matter of course with regard to duly notified
Member State BITs as long as they do not conflict with EU law, overlap with EU treaties
or obstruct the EU’s investment policy.24 However, the Proposal did not meet approval by
the Member States because it included rather stringent Commission screening powers, in
particular of existing BITs, but also concerning IIAs to be negotiated and concluded by
Member States in the future.25 Member States apparently feared the loss of control and
had a sense of being more and more at the mercy of the Commission with regard to their
investment policies.
This Member State reluctance towards the draft regulation led to a weakening of the
Commission’s screening powers in the finally adopted text, as reflected by the change of
the regulation’s subject matter and scope. The latter no longer speaks of an authorization
to maintain existing Member State BITs.26 Also the Commission’s planned review powers
concerning these BITs have been reduced to a mere “assessment” whether they may pose
a “serious obstacle” to new EU IIAs.27 One may wonder, however, whether the deletion of

22.

23.
24.
25.
26.

27.

120

TFEU, supra note 2, art. 2(1) (“When the Treaties confer on the Union exclusive competence in a
specific area, only the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States
being able to do so themselves only if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation of
Union acts.”). For the pre-Lisbon situation, see Case 41/76 Donckerwolke v. Procureur de la
Republique, 1976 E.C.R. 1921. See also PAUL CRAIG, THE LISBON TREATY: LAW, POLITICS AND
TREATY REFORM 259 (2010); PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AND
MATERIALS 79 (5th ed. 2011).
Commission Proposal 2010, supra note 18, art. 1.
See Commission Proposal 2010, supra note 18, arts. 5-6 with regard to Member State BITs in
force.
See in particular, Commission Proposal 2010, supra note 18, arts. 5-6 as well as 11-12.
Regulation No. 1219/2012, supra note 21, art. 1 (“Without prejudice to the division of competences
established by the TFEU, this Regulation addresses the status of the bilateral investment
agreements of the Member States under Union law, and establishes the terms, conditions and
procedures under which the Member States are authorised to amend or conclude bilateral
investment agreements.”).
Regulation No. 1219/2012, supra note 21, art. 5 (“The Commission may assess the bilateral

The EU on the Investment Path

an express “withdrawal of authorisation”28 of existing BITs conflicting with EU law or
overlapping with EU IIAs in the regulation implies a substantive change. Arguably, the
principle of Union loyalty,29 in particular in the strict interpretation given by the Court30
will lead to similar results.
The “grandfathering regulation” does not provide much insight into the substance of a
future EU investment policy. For this purpose, the Commission’s International
Investment Policy Communication of July 2010 seems more useful. It received comments
by the other EU institutions; most importantly among them were the Council
Conclusions of 25 October 201031 and the European Parliament’s resolution of 6 April
2011,32 adopting a report of its International Trade Committee of 22 March 2011.33 On 5
July 2011, the Commission adopted a follow up to this resolution.34 The Economic and
Social Committee submitted its opinion on 13 July 2011.35 However, this proposal has not
led to the adoption of any formal legal instrument and, in particular, it does not provide a
clear indication on the part of the EU how it intends to use its new investment power in
order to structure future IIAs.36 Thus, any assessments on the path the EU is likely to

28.
29.

30.
31.
32.

33.
34.
35.

36.

investment agreements notified pursuant to Article 2, by evaluating whether one or more of their
provisions constitute a serious obstacle to the negotiation or conclusion by the Union of bilateral
investment agreements with third countries, with a view to the progressive replacement of the
bilateral investment agreements notified pursuant to Article 2.”).
Commission Proposal 2010, supra note 18, art. 6.
See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 4(3)(2) and (3), March 30, 2010,
2010 O.J. (C 83) 13 [hereinafter TEU]. (“The Member States shall take any appropriate measure,
general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting
from the acts of the institutions of the Union. The Member States shall facilitate the achievement
of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the
Union’s objectives.”).
Cf. Case C-205/06, Eur. Comm’n v. Austria, 2009, E.C.R. I-1301; Case C-249/06, Eur. Comm’n v.
Kingdom of Sweden, 2009 E.C.R. I-1335; Case C-118/07, Eur. Comm’n v. Finland, 2009 E.C.R. I10889. See also infra note 87.
Conclusions on a comprehensive European international investment policy, 3041st Foreign Affairs
Council
Meeting,
25
October
2010,
available
at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/117328.pdf.
Resolution of 6 April 2011 on the future European international investment policy, EUR. PARL.
DOC (2010/2203 (INI)) [hereinafter Resolution on future European international investment
policy], available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA2011-0141&language=EN.
Committee on International Trade (Rapporteur: Kader Arif), Report on the Future of the European
Investment Policy (2010/2203 (INI)), A7-0070/2011 (March 22, 2011).
Follow up to the European Parliament Resolution on the future European international investment
policy, (5 July 2011), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/spdoc.do?i=19829&j=0&l=en.
Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Communication from the
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Towards a comprehensive European international
investment policy’, 2011 O.J. (C 318) 150.
The Commission has expressly renounced the adoption of a Model BIT/IIA as used by most OECD
members concluding investment treaties. See 2010 Commission Communication, supra note 19, at
6 (“[ . . . ] a one-size-fits-all model for investment agreements with 3rd countries would necessarily
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follow as regards IIAs must be based on inferences drawn from the scarce proposals
available and some informally leaked documents from the negotiating process of
comprehensive trade agreements with third states the EU Commission is currently
engaged in.
At present, it is difficult to ascertain any clear directions from the three main EU
players concerning future EU IIAs. Nevertheless, certain general positions have become
apparent by now. While the Commission seems intent to assert its broad new investment
powers as a question of principle, it is struggling to provide content to its exercise.
Gradually, this content takes shape and now seems to encompass, in addition to market
access provisions, all traditional investment protection standards, including ISDS. The
position of the Council reflects the diverse interests of the Member States, which it
represents in their entirety, ranging from those states which would prefer to keep the
status quo ante and thus their sole responsibility for the conclusion of investment
protection treaties to those which are content with the Lisbon shift of powers to the EU.
The Council’s compromise position appears to be its insistence on investment as an area
of mixed competences between the Union and its members. As regards the substance of
the EU’s future IIA policy, the Council seems to favour a traditional “European”
approach of strong investment protection including ISDS.
The European Parliament equally has to find its new role after the Lisbon Treaty
amendments of the CCP, which gave it the right to be consulted during negotiations, and
requires its consent for treaty conclusions. While siding with the Commission in
demanding broad investment powers for the EU, the Parliament seems to be developing
its own position on the contents of future EU IIAs. In particular, it appears much more
reluctant towards the traditional strong investor protection contained in many European
BITs and has called for sufficient attention to be given to non-investment interests as
well as the Union’s right to regulate and pursue its policies without being hampered by
concerns over investment claims. Thus, the Parliament’s position on investment
protection including ISDS is much more nuanced, if not reserved, than that of the two
other main EU institutions.

IV. Current EU Negotiations on IIAs or Investment Chapters in
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)
Making use of the EU’s new investment treaty-making power, the EU Commission is
currently engaged in negotiations with Canada, India and Singapore on comprehensive
trade agreements which will include an investment chapter.37 Though reports about the

37.
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be neither feasible nor desirable.”).
On the negotiations with Canada see Céline Lévesque, The Challenges of ‘Marrying’ Investment
Liberalisation and Protection in the Canada-EU CETA, in EU AND INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS:
OPEN QUESTIONS AND REMAINING CHALLENGES 121 (Marc Bungenberg, et al. eds., 2013).
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negotiating process are limited, some information can be gleaned from excerpts of the
confidential Negotiating Directives issued by the Council which have been made public
by NGOs.
For instance, the Council Negotiating Directives of 12 September 201138 concerning
the negotiations with Canada, India and Singapore contain valuable information on the
EU’s official position with regard to a number of investment related issues. They
comprise information confirming the EU Commission position that the EU now has a
comprehensive investment power by outlining that an investment chapter should include
fair and equitable treatment (FET), full protection and security, national treatment and
most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment as well as guarantees against uncompensated
expropriation and an umbrella clause. As regards the level of detail, the instructions
appear to favour the traditional European approach by adhering to a rather concise
treaty text, without clarifications limiting the scope of FET and indirect expropriation as
they are known from US and Canadian BITs as well as NAFTA.39 In fact, avoidance of
“NAFTA-contamination” was reportedly a specific wish of some Member State officials.40
With regard to dispute settlement, the need for direct investor-state arbitration seems to
be unquestioned, though the precise contours are still open given the difficulty of access
to ICSID (and ICSID Additional Facility) dispute settlement which appear to be the
Commission’s favourite venues.41
Other negotiations announced in the Commission’s 2010 Communication, such as
those with China and potentially Russia,42 have not yet materialized to an extent that
would allow precise conclusions as to the emerging contours of future EU IIAs.

V. The Emerging Contours of Future EU IIAs
Though the precise shape of EU investment agreements as currently negotiated with
Canada, India and Singapore remains open to be finalized, the past negotiation process
and, in particular, the Council Negotiating Directives concerning these states together

38.

39.
40.

41.
42.

EU Negotiating Mandates on Investment (2011, EU - Canada, India, Singapore FTA’s), (Sept. 12,
2011), available at http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article20272&lang=en as well as at
http://www.s2bnetwork.org/themes/eu-investment-policy/eu-documents/text-of-themandates.html.
See infra notes 173 and 174.
Luke E. Peterson, EU member-states approve negotiating guidelines for India, Singapore and
Canada investment protection talks; some European governments fear “NAFTA-contamination,
INVESTMENT
ARB.
REP.
(Sept.
23
2011),
available
at
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20110923_2.
See infra text accompanying note 96 and 97.
2010 Commission Communication, supra note 19, at 7, mentions both states as potential future
negotiation partners, and considers to negotiate even a stand-alone investment agreement with
China. As regards a potential agreement with China see also Wenhua Shan and Sheng Zhang,
The Potential EU-China BIT: Issues and Implications, in EU AND INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS:
OPEN QUESTIONS AND REMAINING CHALLENGES 87 (Marc Bungenberg, et al. eds., 2013).
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with other official statements, in particular the 2010 Commission Communication on an
international investment policy of the EU, permit the observer to make some inferences.
In general, it seems that the EU is determined to seek a high level of protection for its
investors abroad. The Council has acknowledged this aim by calling for “the highest
possible level of legal protection and certainty for European investors in
Canada/India/Singapore”43 and Commission officials have asserted that the Commission
would “go for the ‘gold standard’ of investment protection provisions,”44 based on the
existing practice of EU Member States.45 This indicates the awareness of the need to go
beyond a common lowest denominator when drafting future investment agreements.46
While expecting that such a high level of investor protection will “increase Europe’s
attractiveness as a destination for foreign investment,”47 the 2010 Commission
Communication48 as well as the Council Negotiating Directives also admonish the need
to guarantee an appropriate regulatory space for the EU and its Member States by
cautioning that an EU investment agreement “shall be without prejudice to the right of
the EU and the Member States to adopt and enforce, in accordance with their respective
competences, measures necessary to pursue legitimate public policy objectives such as
social, environmental, security, public health and safety in a non-discriminatory
manner.”49

43.
44.
45.

46.
47.
48.

49.
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2011 EU Negotiating Mandates, supra note 38.
Hoffmeister and Ünüvar, supra note 6, at 70.
Also the 2010 Commission Communication repeatedly mentions member State BIT provisions
“that should inspire the negotiation of investment agreements at the EU level,” supra note 19, at 8
(concerning umbrella clauses). Similarly, the Council considered that “provisions of future EU
investment agreements” should be fleshed out “on the basis of the experience and the best
practices of the Member States.” Council Conclusions, 3041st Foreign Affairs Council Meeting,
supra note 31, para. 15. Also the EP considered “that future investment agreements concluded by
the EU should be based on the best practices drawn from Member State experiences.” Parliament
Resolution, supra note 32, para. 19.
2011 EU Negotiating Mandates, supra note 38, expressly state that the provisions of the
investment chapters to be negotiated “shall be built upon the Member States’ experience and best
practise regarding their bilateral investment agreements.”
2011 EU Negotiating Mandates, supra note 38.
In order to allow the EU to pursue public policy objectives, the 2010 Commission Communication,
supra note 19, at 9, recalls “that the Union’s trade and investment policy has to fit with the way
the EU and its Member States regulate economic activity within the Union and across our
borders. Investment agreements should be consistent with the other policies of the Union and its
Member States, including policies on the protection of the environment, decent work, health and
safety at work, consumer protection, cultural diversity, development policy and competition
policy.”
2011 EU Negotiating Mandates, supra note 38. As to the need to balance investor protection and
the regulatory freedom of host states, see infra text accompanying note starting at note 165.
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A. The Scope of Future EU IIAs
As regards the scope of future investment agreements, the EU obviously plans to
adhere to the concept of modern investment agreement practice to include both FDI and
portfolio investments,50 even if this comes at the price of not being able to exercise an
exclusive CCP competence.51 Indeed, investment agreements limited to FDI would be
highly unusual and – because of the difficulty in distinguishing between FDI and
portfolio investments in specific cases – might lead to protracted jurisdictional disputes
not in the interest of investment protection. According to the Council Negotiating
Directives with Canada, India and Singapore, the investment protection chapters of
these agreements “shall cover a broad range of investors and their investments,
intellectual property rights included, whether the investment is made before or after the
entry into force of the agreement.”52 Commentators have equally stressed that the EU
should strive for a “broad definition of investment with a non-exhaustive list”.53 This
would imply that future EU IIAs are likely to contain a broad asset-based definition of
“investment” as currently contained in most EU Member State BITs. Uncertainty may
stem from the fact that the EP has expressly called for the exclusion of “speculative forms
of investment”.54 In practice it would appear difficult to distinguish between “speculative”
and “non-speculative” portfolio (or even direct) investment.55

B. Admission/Access Provisions
Past agreements of the EC/EU dealing with investments largely addressed questions
of admission only and did so by adopting a GATS-inspired market access approach, i.e.
making specific commitments in specific areas.56 The EU institutions have in general
confirmed their intention to continue this policy of market access/liberalisation.57
50.
51.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

57.

See supra note 13.
The 2011 EU Negotiating Mandates, supra note 38, state that the Commission should aim at
including “into the investment protection chapter of the agreement areas of mixed competence,
such as portfolio investment, [ . . . ].” For a more expansive interpretation of the EU’s powers, see
the Commission’s view supra text at note 14.
2011 EU Negotiating Mandates, supra note 38, (under “Scope”).
Hoffmeister and Ünüvar, supra note 6, at 71.
See 2011 Parliament Resolution, supra note 32, ¶ 11.
See in detail infra text accompanying notes 147 – 149.
See, e.g., the provisions on “commercial presence” of Article 65 et seq. Economic Partnership
Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the European Community and
its Member States, of the other part, 2008 O.J. (L 289/I/4) 1, as well as Section C of Chapter 7 of
16 September 2010 on the signing, on behalf of the EU-Korea FTA, Free Trade Agreement
between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of
the other part, art. 7.8, 2011 O.J. (L 127) 1, which provides for MFN treatment and specific
market access commitments and national treatment in separate schedules. See also ANGELOS
DIMOPOULOS, EU FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW 52 (2011).
See 2010 Commission Communication, supra note 19, at 5 (“[ . . . ] our trade policy will seek to
integrate investment liberalisation and investment protection”); Council Conclusions, 3041st
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However, it is unclear whether the current market access approach will continue or
whether the EU will adopt the North American practice of extending national treatment
to the admission phase in order to secure market access as found in NAFTA as well as
US and Canadian BITs.58

C. Substantive Investment Protection
As regards substantive treatment of investments, it appears that future EU IIAs will
include all the standards of treatment currently contained in EU Member State BITs.
Again, the Council Negotiating Directives with Canada, India and Singapore are most
instructive in this regard because they are most detailed. They contain basically all the
treatment standards that can be found in modern BITs, from FET, full protection and
security, national treatment and MFN, to compensation guarantees in case of
expropriation and free transfer obligations.59 In addition, they call for “rules concerning

58.

59.
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Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, supra note 31, ¶ 6 (“The new EU international investment policy
should increase the level of competitiveness of the Union and open new markets.”).
See e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1102(1), Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA] (“Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party
treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or
other disposition of investments.”); Canadian Model Foreign Investment Protection Agreement
(FIPA), art. 3(1), 2004, reprinted in CHESTER BROWN (ED.), COMMENTARIES ON SELECTED MODEL
INVESTMENT TREATIES 53 (2013) [hereinafter Canadian Model FIPA] (“Each Party shall accord to
investors of the other Party treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like
circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion,
management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory.”). See
also the discussion in a study for the EP Committee on International Trade, Stephen Woolcock &
Jan Kleinheisterkamp, The EU Approach to International Investment Policy after the Lisbon
Treaty, 31-87 (2010), http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/news/2010-11-03%20EU.pdf.
Pursuant to the title “Standards of treatment” of the 2011 EU Negotiating Mandates, supra note
38:
[ . . . ] the negotiations shall aim to include in particular but not exclusively the
following standards of treatment and rules:
a) fair and equitable treatment, including a prohibition of unreasonable, arbitrary
or discriminatory measures,
b) unqualified national treatment,
c) unqualified most-favoured nation treatment,
d) protection against direct and indirect expropriation, including the right to
prompt, adequate and effective compensation,
e) full protection and security of investors and investments,
f) other effective protection provisions, such as ?umbrella clause?
g) free transfer of funds of capital and payments by investors
h) rules concerning subrogation.
Except for subrogation provisions, all these standards can also be found in the 2010 Commission
Communication, supra note 19, at 8-9. See also the Council Conclusions, 3041st Foreign Affairs
Council Meeting, supra note 31, ¶ 14, according to which the Council “STRESSES the need to
ensure the inclusion in the substance of future negotiations of the fundamental standards of “fair
and equitable treatment”, non-discrimination (“most-favored-nation treatment” and “national
treatment”), “full protection and security” treatment of investors and investments, protection
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subrogation” which are typical in case an insurer compensates an investor and then
needs to be able to raise claims against the host state.60
1.

Umbrella Clauses

The version of the leaked Negotiating Directives concerning Canada, India and
Singapore is a bit more ambiguous with regard to umbrella clauses since they are
mentioned with question marks under “other effective investment protection
provisions.”61 Indeed, umbrella clauses have been controversial in investment arbitration
practice with respect to their practical effect.62 Some tribunals follow the approach of
SGS v. Pakistan which rejected the view that “breaches of a contract […] concluded with
a State (widely considered to be a matter of municipal rather than international law) are
automatically ‘elevated’ to the level of breaches of international law.”63 Other tribunals
adhere to the traditional view endorsed by SGS v. Philippines that an umbrella clause
“makes it a breach of the BIT for the host State to fail to observe binding commitments,
including contractual commitments, which it has assumed with regard to specific
investments. But it does not convert the issue of the extent or content of such obligations
into an issue of international law.”64 It may be that the EU has not yet decided whether

60.
61.
62.

63.

64.

against expropriation (including the right to prompt, adequate and effective compensation), free
transfer of funds of capital and payments by investors, as well as other effective protection
provisions (such as, where appropriate, the so-called “umbrella clauses”) and dispute settlement
mechanisms and CONSIDERS that these principles should be the main pillars of future EU
investment agreements.”
See CHRISTOPH SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY, 186-1286 (2d ed.
2009).
2011 EU Negotiating Mandates, supra note 38, provide under “Standards of Treatment” (“f) other
effective protection provisions, such as ?umbrella clause?”).
See Christoph Schreuer, Travelling the BIT Route: Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella. Clauses and
Forks in the Road, 5 THE J. OF WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 231 (2004); Anthony Sinclair, The
Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the International Law of Investment Protection, 20 ARB. INT’L
411 (2004); Thomas Wälde, The “Umbrella” Clause on Investment Arbitration—A Comment on
Original Intentions and Recent Cases, 6 THE J. OF WORLD INVESTMENT AND TRADE 183 (2005);
Stanimir Alexandrov, Breaches of Contract and Breaches of Treaty – The Jurisdiction of Treatybased Arbitration Tribunals to Decide Breach of Contract Claims in SGS v Pakistan and SGS v
Philippines, 5 THE J. OF WORLD INVESTMENT AND TRADE 555 (2004).
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 163, (Aug. 6, 2003). See also Salini Costruttori S.p.A and
Italstrade S.p.A v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision on
Jurisdiction, (Nov. 15, 2004); El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 85 (April 27, 2006),; Pan American Energy
LLC and BP Argentina Exploration Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13,
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 113 (July 27, 2006).
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 128 (Jan. 29, 2004).. See also Noble Ventures, Inc. v.
Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶ 53 (Oct. 12, 2005); Bureau Veritas, Inspection,
Valuation, Assessment and Control, BIVAC B.V. v. Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/9, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction (May 29, 2009).
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it would endorse the potentially far-reaching implications of an umbrella clause, though
the 2010 Commission Communication suggest that umbrella clauses are regarded as
valuable tools for the protection of contractual rights of investors.65
2.

Non-discrimination standards

With regard to the main substantive standards, it appears that the EU is determined
to follow the path of traditional short formulations found in most EU Member State
BITs, though it is difficult to judge this from the available documents alone. The wording
of the Council Negotiating Directives with Canada, India and Singapore may be viewed
as mere headings.66
While the Commission has asserted that “non-discrimination should continue to be a
key ingredient of EU investment negotiations,”67 it remains unclear whether future
national treatment and MFN clauses should be limited to the post-establishment phase
or extend to the admission phase, thus de facto allowing for market access.68
On the basis of present EU documents it is also not clear whether the institutions
have formed an opinion on whether a MFN clause should encompass dispute settlement
as in the Maffezini case69 or not.70 This indecision may result from the fact that
investment jurisprudence is highly inconsistent, with tribunals disagreeing sharply
whether an MFN clause should permit claimants to invoke more favourable procedural,
maybe even jurisdictional,71 provisions in third country BITs or at least to overcome
procedural obstacles, such as waiting periods,72 or whether it would not permit so.73
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

71.
72.

73.
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2010 Commission Communication, supra note 19, at 8 (“They have been traditionally used in
Member States BITs and are an important element among others that should inspire the
negotiation of investment agreements at the EU level.”).
See supra text accompanying note 58.
2010 Commission Communication, supra note 19, at 8.
In regards to the different options to provide for market access, see supra text accompanying note
58.
Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction (Jan. 25,
2000).
See also Stephen Fietta, Most Favoured Nation Treatment and Dispute Resolution under Bilateral
Investment Treaties: A Turning Point?, 8 INT’L ARB. L. REV. 131 (2005); Emmanuel Gaillard,
Establishing Jurisdiction through a Most-Favored-Nation Clause, 233 N.Y.L.J. 1, 3 (2005); Kai
Hobér, MFN Clauses and Dispute Resolution in Investment Treaties: Have we reached the end of
the road?, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 31 (Christina Binder et al.
eds., 2009); August Reinisch, How Narrow are Narrow Dispute Settlement Clauses in Investment
Treaties?, 2 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 115 (2011).
RosInvestCo UK Ltd. v. The Russian Federation, Award on Jurisdiction 2007, SCC Case No. Arb.
V079/2005.
See, e.g., Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on
Jurisdiction, Aug. 3, 2004; Impreglio S.p.A. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17,
Award, June 21, 2011; Hochtief AG v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/31, Decision on
Jurisdiction, Oct. 24, 2011.
In Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on
Jurisdiction, Feb. 8, 2005, ¶ 223, the tribunal held that “an MFN provision in a basic treaty does
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Finally, with regard to the Council’s directives suggesting that the Commission should
negotiate “unqualified” national treatment and MFN provisions, it may be unclear
whether this implies that such clauses should follow the traditional “European” approach
of merely providing for non-discrimination74 or whether it would allow specifications to
“like circumstances” as often found in North American IIAs75.76 However, the
Parliament’s wish clearly suggests that such a specification should be adopted.77
3.

Fair and Equitable Treatment as Well as Full Protection and

Security
Concerning FET and full protection and security, the EU seems determined to
continue the traditional IIA policy of its Member States to adopt short provisions.
Already the 2010 Commission Communication qualified these standards as “an
important element among others that should inspire the negotiation of investment
agreements at the EU level.”78 Indeed, there are good arguments in favour of the
straightforward versions of FET omitting any references to the “international minimum
standard”, as found in NAFTA,79 or US BITs,80 or qualifications of the full protection and
security to include “legal protection”, as found in some German BITs81.82

74.

75.
76.

77.
78.
79.

not incorporate by reference dispute settlement provisions in whole or in part set forth in another
treaty, unless the MFN provision in the basic treaty leaves no doubt that the Contracting Parties
intended to incorporate them.” The tribunal in Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, Award, Dec. 8, 2008, even denied the avoidance of waiting
periods.
See, e.g. Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the
Republic of Austria and Ukraine art. 3(1), Nov. 8, 1996, 1995 U.N.T.S. 405 [hereinafter
Austria/Ukraine BIT], (“Each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of the other Contracting
Party and their investments treatment no less favourable than that which it accords to its own
investors and their investments or to investors in third States and their investments.”).
See, e.g. Canadian Model FIPA, art. 3(1), 2004, supra text accompanying note 58.
It was asserted that the express mandate in the 2011 EU Negotiating Mandates that the nondiscrimination standards of MFN and national treatment should be “unqualified” (see supra text
accompanying note 59) implied that they should not include any reference to “like circumstances”
as they can be found e.g. in U.S. and Canadian BITs as well as in NAFTA (See supra note 58). See
also Hoffmeister and Ünüvar, supra note 6, at 71. However, it may also be that the intention
merely was to clarify that the Council did not wish to have any conditional MFN or national
treatment contained in the future investment chapters under negotiation.
Resolution on future European international investment policy, supra note 32, para. 19 (“nondiscrimination (national treatment and most favoured nation), with a more precise wording in the
definition mentioning that foreign and national investors must operate ‘in like circumstances’.”).
2010 Commission Communication, supra note 19, at 8.
See NAFTA, supra note 58, art. 1105 (“Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of
another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security.”). In Section B(1) of the Free Trade Commission’s
Clarifications
Related
to
NAFTA
Chapter
11,
1,
2
(July
31,
2001),
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/nafta/chap11interp.pdf., this was held to be co-extensive, and thus
limited, to the protection available under the international minimum standard (“Article 1105(1)
prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the
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References to the “international minimum standard” in FET clauses have been
regarded as limitations to the customary international law standard, in particular by
NAFTA tribunals,83 which have the potential to considerably lower the level of investor
protection and, conversely, increase the regulatory discretion of host states. This latter
consequence may have inspired the Parliament to call for the inclusion of FET clauses
“defined on the basis of the level of treatment established by international customary
law.”84
4.

Transfer Clauses

The Council Negotiating Directives with Canada, India and Singapore may again be
relied upon to presume that future EU IIAs will routinely include guarantees on the “free
transfer of funds of capital and payments by investors.”85 Already the 2010 Commission
Communication stated that “EU clauses ensuring the free transfer of funds of capital and

80.

81.
82.

83.

84.
85.
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minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of another Party. 2.
The concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ do not require
treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law
minimum standard of treatment of aliens.”).
Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
[Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection Investment (U.S. Model
BIT), art. 5, 2004 [hereinafter U.S. Model BIT, 2004] “1. Each Party shall accord to covered
investments treatment in accordance with customary international law, including fair and
equitable treatment and full protection and security. 2. For greater certainty, paragraph 1
prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the
minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to covered investments. The concepts of “fair and
equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” do not require treatment in addition to or
beyond that which is required by that standard, and do not create additional substantive rights.”).
Article 4 (1) Germany/Argentina BIT (“Investments by nationals or companies of either
Contracting Party shall enjoy full legal protection and full legal security in the territory of the
other Contracting Party.”).
On the basis of such an express clause, the tribunal in Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶ 303, (Feb. 6, 2007) held that “[ . . . ] the obligation to provide
full protection and security is wider than “physical” protection and security. It is difficult to
understand how the physical security of an intangible asset would be achieved. In the instant
case, “security” is qualified by “legal.” In its ordinary meaning “legal security” has been defined as
“the quality of the legal system which implies certainty in its norms and, consequently, their
foreseeable application.”
See Mondev International Ltd. v. U.S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, ICSID Additional
Facility Award, ¶ 122, (Oct. 11, 2002); United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Government of
Canada, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 97 (Nov. 22, 2002); ADF Group Inc. v. U.S.A., Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/1, Award, ¶ 199, (Jan. 9, 2003); The Loewen Group, Inc. v. U.S.A., ICSID Case No.
ARB (AF)/98/3, Award, ¶ 125-127, (June 26, 2003,); Waste Management, Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, ¶ 90-91 (April 30, 2004); Methanex Corp. v. U.S.A.,
NAFTA/UNICTRAL, Part II, Ch. H, para. 23, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and
Merits, (Aug. 3, 2005), See also the interpretation of the 2001 NAFTA Free Trade Commission,
supra note 79.
Resolution on future European international investment policy, supra note 32, para. 19.
2011 EU Negotiating Mandates, supra note 38, under “Standards of Treatment.”
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payments by investors should be included.”86 Given the Commission’s rigorous approach
to defend the EU’s capacity to impose limits on such free transfer obligations for political
reasons at any time,87 it is to be expected that future free transfer clauses will contain
express exceptions allowing the EU legislator to adopt restrictive measures under Article
6688 and 215 TFEU.89 It has been suggested that such an exception could resemble the
security exception of the EU-Korea FTA.90
5.

Expropriation

The question whether the EU has the power to adopt expropriation clauses in future
IIAs has been controversial since the time the enlargement of the CCP was negotiated.
While many commentators and apparently also EU Member States have referred to the
exclusion of issues of property ownership from the scope of the TFEU and thus of the
EU’s external investment power,91 the Commission seems determined to include
expropriation among the topics the EU has the competence to deal with. Again the

86.
87.

88.

89.

90.

91.

2010 Commission Communication, supra note 19, at 9.
Case C-205/06, European Commission v. Austria, 2009 E.C.R. I-1301; Case C-249/06, European
Commission v. Kingdom of Sweden, 2009 E.C.R. I-1335; Case C-118/07, European Commission v.
Finland, 2009 E.C.R. I-10889. In these cases the European Court of Justice (ECJ) found that even
the mere possibility of a potential obstruction of the EU’s regulatory power to adopt transfer
restrictions by capital transfer clauses in Member State BITs was sufficient to lead to an
incompatibility with EU law. See also Eileen Denza, Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU rules
on free transfer: Comment on Commission v Austria, Commission v Sweden and Commission v
Finland, 35 EUR. L. REV. 263 (2010); Nikos Lavranos, New Developments in the Interaction
between International Investment Law and EU Law, 9 L. & PRAC. OF INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 409
(2010); August Reinisch, Introductory Note to European Court of Justice: Commission of the
European Communities v. Austria and Sweden, 48 I.L.M. 470 (2009).
TFEU, supra note 2, art. 66 (“Where, in exceptional circumstances, movements of capital to or
from third countries cause, or threaten to cause, serious difficulties for the operation of economic
and monetary union, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the
European Central Bank, may take safeguard measures with regard to third countries for a period
not exceeding six months if such measures are strictly necessary.”).
TFEU, supra note 2, art. 215(1) (“Where a decision, adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title
V of the Treaty on European Union, provides for the interruption or reduction, in part or
completely, of economic and financial relations with one or more third countries, the Council,
acting by a qualified majority on a joint proposal from the High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission, shall adopt the necessary measures. It
shall inform the European Parliament thereof.”).
See Hoffmeister and Ünüvar, From BITS and Pieces towards European Investment Agreements,
supra note 6, at 73, referring to Article 15.9 of the EU-Korea FTA, Free Trade Agreement between
the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the
other part, 2011 O.J. (L 127) 6, which is in turn inspired by the General Agreement on Tariffs And
Trade (GATT) Article XXI. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXI, Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A-3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187[hereinafter GATT].
See, e.g., Christian Tietje, Die Außenwirtschaftsverfassung der EU nach dem Vertrag von
Lissabon, 83 BEITRÄGE ZUM TRANSNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 16 (2009); T. R. Braun, Für
einen
komplementären,
europäischen
Investitionsschutz,
in
INTERNATIONALER
INVESTITIONSSCHUTZ UND EUROPARECHT 191 (Marc Bungenberg, et al. eds., 2010).
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absence of any clear EU template makes it difficult to infer the precise scope and content
of a potential EU expropriation clause. However, the pieces found in different documents
may be put together to form a discernible mosaic. While the Council Negotiating
Directives with Canada, India and Singapore speak of “protection against direct and
indirect expropriation, including the right to prompt, adequate and effective
compensation”92, the 2010 Commission Communication admonishes that the “Union
should include precise clauses covering this issue [i.e. that expropriation measures
should be non-discriminatory and proportionate to attain their legitimate objective] into
its own future investment or trade agreements.”93 It would thus appear that any future
expropriation clauses are likely to closely resemble the clauses found in existing EU
Member State BITs. Whether it will also contain an attempt to more closely define the
notion of indirect expropriation, as can be found in some more recent North American
BITs94 remains to be seen.95

D. The Place of Investor-State Dispute Settlement in the EU’s
Investment Architecture
In the initial phase of the discussion of a new EU external investment policy, the EU’s
institutions unsettled the investment community by their apparent reluctance towards
investor-state dispute settlement. While the Commission was silent for a considerable
period of time, it eventually came forward with a positive assessment. Still, the
Parliament in particular voiced concern96 about the far-reaching implications of ISDS
that might compromise the right to regulate.97
This reserved stance was indeed irritating for states and investors who had accepted
that ISDS fulfilled a crucial function in effectively securing the substantive protections
granted in IIAs.98 With the coming of age of ISDS in the 1990s and the first decade of the

92.
93.
94.
95.

96.

97.
98.
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2011 EU Negotiating Mandates, supra note 38, under “Standards of Treatment.”
2010 Commission Communication, supra note 19, at 9.
See, e.g., the “shared understanding” on expropriation in Annex B of the U.S. Model BIT 2004. U.S
Model BIT 2004 annex B, 2004, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf.
It appears that such a closer definition is what the Parliament would like to see in future IIAs
when it called for “protection against direct and indirect expropriation, giving a definition that
establishes a clear and fair balance between public welfare objectives and private interests.”
Resolution on future European international investment policy, supra note 32, para. 19.
Resolution on future European international investment policy, supra note 32, para. 24
(“Expresses its deep concern regarding the level of discretion of international arbitrators to make
a broad interpretation of investor protection clauses, thereby leading to the ruling out of
legitimate public regulations; calls on the Commission to produce clear definitions of investor
protection standards in order to avoid such problems in the new investment agreements.”).
See also infra text at note 164.
See, e.g., Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶
54 (Jan. 25, 2000), (“[ . . . ] dispute settlement arrangements are inextricably related to the
protection of foreign investors, as they are also related to the protection of rights of traders under
treaties of commerce.”); Gas Natural SDG SA v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/10, Decision on
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21st century, it has become accepted that removing investment protection from the
traditional paradigm of diplomatic protection has contributed to the de-politicization of
investment disputes.99
Meanwhile, the initial reluctance of the EU institutions seems to have given way to a
full endorsement of ISDS. In its 2010 Communication on investment, the Commission
acknowledged the importance of ensuring the effective enforceability of investment
protection standards through ISDS which formed “a key part of the inheritance that the
Union receives from Member State BITs.”100 And the Council in its Conclusions stressed
“the need for an effective investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanism in the EU
investment agreements.”101
Currently, the Commission appears determined to include ISDS and has even
specifically addressed the issue of allocating responsibility (and in particular financial
liability) between the Union and its Member States by proposing a regulation
establishing a “framework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-state
dispute settlement tribunals.”102 This proposal builds on and deepens the template
adopted already in the mid-1990s when the EC joined the Energy Charter Treaty
(ECT)103 as a full participant. Prior to the ECT’s entry-into-force, the EC confirmed that
it can become a respondent to individual claims raised by investors, and that the
Community and its Member States concerned would determine the proper respondent
within 30 days of receiving such a request among themselves.104
In addition to the difficulty of allocating responsibility, ISDS raises serious problems
as regards available arbitration venues. Investor-state arbitration and conciliation under
the ICSID Convention105 are available only to states and nationals of states parties to the

99.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Jurisdiction, ¶ 49 (June 17, 2005) (“[ . . . ] assurance of independent international arbitration is an
important – perhaps the most important – element in investor protection.”).
See also Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The
Roles of ICSID and MIGA, 1 ICSID Review Foreign Investment L.J. (1986). In fact, the latter
concept is considered to be one of the major achievements of the ICSID Convention. See, e.g.,
CHRISTOPH SCHREUER ET AL, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 416 (2009); Christoph
Schreuer, Investment Protection and International Relations, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS: LIBER AMICORUM HANSPETER NEUHOLD 345, 346-347 (August Reinisch & Ursula
Kriebaum eds., 2007).
2010 Commission Communication, supra note 19, at 9. It also considered that: “ISDS is such an
established feature of investment agreements that its absence would in fact discourage investors
and make a host economy less attractive than others.”
Council Conclusions, 3041st Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, supra note 31, para. 18.
Commission Proposal 2012, supra note 20. See also Colin Brown & Ilmārs Naglis, Dispute
Settlement in Future EU Investment Agreements, in EU AND INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: OPEN
QUESTIONS AND REMAINING CHALLENGES 17 (Marc Bungenberg, et al. eds., 2013).
Energy Charter Treaty, Annex 1 to the Final Act of the Conference on the European Energy
Charter, Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 381 (1995).
Statement by the European Communities to the Secretariat of the Energy Charter pursuant to
Article 26(3)(b)(ii) of the Energy Charter Treaty, 1998 O.J. (L 69/115).
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
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Convention.106 Access to the ICSID Convention is open to member states of the IBRD or
to any other state which is a party to the ICJ Statute.107 Thus, statehood is a clear
requirement for adherence to the ICSID Convention which clearly prevents the EU in its
current form from becoming a contracting party. Opening ICSID dispute settlement
(conciliation and arbitration) to the EU would thus require a treaty revision which is
theoretically possible,108 practically, however, very unlikely to be achieved.109
Nevertheless, the Commission stated its intention that it would explore this option.110 In
the medium term, it appears more realistic that the EU will adopt ISDS clauses
providing for investment arbitration to be conducted under UNCITRAL111 or other
arbitration rules.112
Interestingly, the Commission has reacted to two specific issues frequently discussed
in the investment arbitration community that have raised a certain degree of concern,
the questions of sufficient transparency113 and of potential inconsistencies of outcomes.114

106.
107.
108.
109.

110.
111.
112.

113.

134

States, March 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
See ICSID Convention, supra note 105, art. 25(1).
ICSID Convention, supra note 105, art. 67.
See ICSID Convention, supra note 105, arts. 65 & 66.
According to ICSID Convention art. 66(1), amendments must be accepted by all Contracting
Parties. The practical difficulties of revising the ICSID Convention were discussed when the
introduction of an appellate body was debated. ICSID Convention, supra note 105, art. 66(1). See
Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration, ICSID Secretariat Discussion
Paper (Oct. 26, 2004), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org. See also David Gantz, An Appellate
Mechanism for Review of Arbitral Decisions in Investor-State Disputes: Prospects and Challenges,
39 VANDERBILT J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. (2006); Barton Legum, Options to Establish an Appellate
Mechanism for Investment Disputes, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
DISPUTES 231 (Karl Sauvant ed., 2008); Asif Qureshi, An Appellate System in International
Investment Arbitration?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1154
(Peter Muchlinski, et al eds. 2008); Christian Tams, An Appealing Option? The Debate about an
ICSID Appellate Structure, in BEITRÄGE ZUM TRANSNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT, Heft 57
(Ch. Tietje et al. eds., 2006).
2010 Commission Communication, supra note 19, at 10 (“The Commission will explore with
interested parties the possibility that the European Union seek to accede to the ICSID Convention
(noting that this would require amendment of the ICSID Convention).”).
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules, U.N.
GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17, Ch. V, Sec. C, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (Dec. 15, 1976), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1976Arbitration_rules.html.
It is not clear why the EP considers that next to ICSID also UNCITRAL arbitration would not be
available to the EU. See Resolution on future European international investment policy, supra
note 32, para. 33. The reason given by the Parliament that the EU is not a member of UNCITRAL
is not convincing since UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules can be widely used by private, state and
non-state entities, including international organizations.
See on transparency in general V.V. Veeder, The Transparency of International Arbitration:
Process and Substance, in PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 89 (Loukas K.
Mistelis & Julian Lew eds., 2006); Howard Mann, Transparency and Consistency in International
Investment Law: Can the Problem be fixed by Tinkering? in APPEALS MECHANISM IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 213 (Karl Sauvant ed., 2008); Julie A. Maupin,
Transparency in International Investment Law: The Good, the Bad, and the Murky, in
TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Andrea Bianchi & Anne Peters eds., forthcoming Dec.
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The Commission appears intent on addressing these problems by providing for a broad
level of transparency in its future IIAs115 and by taking into consideration the use of
quasi-permanent arbitrators and the creation of appellate mechanisms.116 The
Parliament endorsed these thoughts and added further ideas for improvement,117 such as
the institutionalisation of amicus curiae participation118 and the more controversial
enhancement of the role of domestic courts through requiring exhaustion of local
remedies.119

VI. Controversial Issues
As the preceding sections have shown an EU investment policy is gradually
developing. However, there still remain many open issues some of which will be analysed
in more detail in the following pages.
The precise scope of exclusive IIA powers after Lisbon remains unclear. Both the
Union and its Member States – and apparently both the Commission and the Council –

2013).
114. See Ari Afilalo, Towards a Common Law of International Investment: How NAFTA Chapter 11
Panels should Solve their Legitimacy Crisis, 17 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 51 (2004); Susan
Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International
Law through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005); Charles Brower, Michael
Ottolenghi, & Peter Prows Ottolenghi, The Saga of CMS: Res judicata, Precedent and the
Legitimacy of ICSID Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 843 (Christina Binder, et al eds. 2009); August
Reinisch, The Role of Precedent in ICSID Arbitration, 2008 Austrian Arb. Y.B. 495; Lucy Reed,
The De Facto Precedent Regime in Investment Arbitration: A Case for Proactive Case Management,
25 ICSID REVIEW 95 (2010); Andres Rigo Sureda, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: JUDGING
UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2012).
115. 2010 Commission Communication, supra note 19, at 10 (“[T]he EU should ensure that investorstate dispute settlement is conducted in a transparent manner (including requests for arbitration,
submissions, open hearings, amicus curiae briefs and publication of awards;)”).
116. 2010 Commission Communication, supra note 19, at 10 (“Consistency and predictability are key
issues and the use of quasi-permanent arbitrators (as in the EU's FTA practice) and/or appellate
mechanisms, where there is a likelihood of many claims under a particular agreement, should be
considered;”).
117. Resolution on future European international investment policy, supra note 32, para. 31 (“Believes
that changes must be made to the present dispute settlement regime, in order to include greater
transparency, the opportunity for parties to appeal, the obligation to exhaust local judicial
remedies where they are reliable enough to guarantee due process, the possibility to use amicus
curiae briefs and the obligation to select one single place of investor-state arbitration.”).
118. See Christina Knahr & August Reinisch, Transparency versus Confidentiality in International
Investment Arbitration – The Biwater Gauff Compromise, 6 THE L. AND PRAC. OF INT’L CTS AND
TRIBUNALS 97 (2007); Alexis Mourre, Are Amici Curiae the proper response to the public’s concern
on transparency in investment arbitration?, 5 THE L. AND PRAC. OF INT’L CTS AND TRIBUNALS 257
(2006).
119. See Christoph Schreuer, Calvo’s Grandchildren: The Return of Local Remedies in Investment
Arbitration, 4 THE L. AND PRAC. OF INT’L CTS AND TRIBUNALS 1 (2005); Ursula Kriebaum, Local
Remedies and Standards for Protection, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 417 (Christina Binder, et al eds., 2009).
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seem to pursue a broad approach towards future EU IIAs with regard to the inclusion of
FDI as well as of provisions on expropriation and ISDS. They do so in a pragmatic way by
proceeding on the basis of a mixed agreement without clearly determining their
respective spheres of competences. However, that fact can only insufficiently veil the
continuing divergences of opinions as to the true allocation of powers which also relates
to the question of who is empowered to regulate questions concerning expropriation in
future EU IIAs. Another highly contentious issue concerns the future of intra-EU-BITs,
where some Member States and the EU seem to be on a collision course. But also in areas
where there is less disagreement between the main actors questions remain open, such
as the problem of the scope investments to be protected in future EU IIAs or the right
balance between investment protection and regulatory freedom of the Member States
and the EU. To another group of open issues belong problems rarely addressed in the
official debate, such as whether the envisaged continuation of ISDS is compatible with
the existing EU system of legal protection through the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU).120

A. FDI or More – Does the EU’s New Investment Power Encompass
Portfolio Investment?
Article 206 as well as 207 TFEU are fairly clear; they speak of “foreign direct
investment” in circumscribing the new CCP power. In spite of this apparently limiting
language, the EU Commission rejects a narrow reading of its investment powers and
asserts that it also includes an implied power concerning portfolio investments. Most
Member States and also the Council, representing Member States’ interests, prefer a
more textual interpretation and have expressed their view that the EU’s powers are
limited to FDI and do not include portfolio investments.
This question is a real and practical problem because modern BITs and IIAs usually
cover both FDI and portfolio investments.121 Thus, for the EU to enter the scene of

120. The Lisbon Treaty has restructured the judicial system of the European Union. The European
Court of Justice (ECJ), now referred to as “Court of Justice”, has become part of the broader
judicial architecture of the EU. TEU Article 19 states that “the Court of Justice of the European
Union shall include the Court of Justice, the General Court and specialised courts.” The General
Court is the former Court of First Instance and the most important “specialised court” currently
existing is the European Union Civil Service Tribunal. TEU, supra note 29, art. 19.
121. See, e.g., U.S. Model BIT 2004, supra note 94, art. 1:
“[I]nvestment” means every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or
indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics
as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the
assumption of risk. Forms that an investment may take include:
(a) an enterprise;
(b) shares, stock, and other forms of equity participation in an enterprise;
(c) bonds, debentures, other debt instruments, and loans;
(d) futures, options, and other derivatives;
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investment treaty players it would be highly unorthodox if it wished to conclude
agreements covering only FDI. In fact, the EU institutions have clearly expressed their
view that future EU IIAs should broadly encompass both FDI and portfolio
investment.122 Therefore it is crucial to know whether the EU can conclude IIAs covering
both FDI and portfolio investments itself or whether it needs the Member States. In the
latter case, this would require the conclusion of so-called mixed agreements to be
negotiated and concluded by both the EU and its Member States.123 From a political
perspective this is important since mixed agreements require separate ratification by the
Member States. Today, this additional weight may appear not so crucial since the current
rules of CCP treaty-making require unanimity in the Council in matters of FDI “where
such agreements include provisions for which unanimity is required for the adoption of
internal rules.”124 However, the evolution of the EU’s gradual enlargement of the CCP
has demonstrated a general shift from rule-making dominated by the Member States to
centralized EC/EU legislation.125 Similarly the current unanimity requirement for FDI
matters in the Council may change in the future. In this situation, only a mixed
competence would ensure sufficient bargaining power to the individual Member States.
The conflicting positions can be roughly summarized as follows: In its original
Communication on an international investment policy, the Commission was not yet very
clear on that point. It first elaborated on the definition of FDI as an investment “which
serves to establish lasting and direct links with the undertaking” without taking a clear
stance on portfolio investment.126 In a subsequent passage, entitled “Looking beyond
foreign direct investment”, the Commission suggested that “to the extent that
international agreements on investment affect the scope of the common rules set by the

122.
123.

124.
125.

126.

(e) turnkey, construction, management, production, concession, revenue-sharing,
and other similar contracts;
(f) intellectual property rights;
(g) licenses, authorizations, permits, and similar rights conferred pursuant to
domestic law; and
(h) other tangible or intangible, movable or immovable property, and related
property rights, such as leases, mortgages, liens, and pledges.
See supra text accompanying note starting at note 49.
See Ramses Wessel, The EU as a Party to International Agreements: Shared Competences, Mixed
Responsibilities, in LAW AND PRACTICE OF EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS: SALIENT FEATURES OF A
CHANGING LANDSCAPE 152 (Alan Dashwood & Marc Maresceau eds., 2008). See also Alan
Dashwood & Christophe Hillion (eds.), THE GENERAL LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS (2000);
MIXED AGREEMENTS REVISITED: THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES IN THE WORLD (Christophe
Hillion & Panos Koutrakos eds., 2010).
TFEU, supra note 2, art. 207(4).
DIMOPOULOS, EU FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 6, at 86; PIET ECKHOUT, EXTERNAL
RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. LEGAL CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 9-16 (2004); PAUL
CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 319-322 (5th ed. 2011);
PANOS KOUTRAKOS, EU INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LAW (MODERN STUDIES IN EUROPEAN LAW)
11-75 (2006).
2010 Communication, supra note 19, at 2-4.
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Treaty’s Chapter on capitals and payments, the exclusive Union competence to conclude
agreements in this area would be implied.”127 In its 2012 Financial Responsibility
Regulation proposal the Commission is much more explicit in asserting that “the Union
has exclusive competence to conclude agreements covering all matters relating to foreign
investment, that is both foreign direct investment and portfolio investment.”128 In
addition to the express FDI power contained in Article 207 TFEU, the Commission
clearly postulates an implied power relating to portfolio investment as well:
“The Union’s competence for portfolio investment stems, in the Commission’s view,
from Article 63 TFEU. That article provides that the movement of capital between
Member States of the Union and third countries is to be free of restrictions. Article
3(2) TFEU provides for the exclusive competence of the Union whenever rules
included in an international agreement “may affect common rules or alter their
scope.” In the Commission's view, the Union must have exclusive competence also
over matters of portfolio investment since the rules being envisaged, which would
apply indistinctly to portfolio investment, may affect the common rules on capital
movement set down in Article 63 of the Treaty.”129
Member States in general do not appear to share this view. A very explicit rejection
can be found in the Lisbon Treaty judgment of the German Constitutional Court which
argued as follows:
“The extension of the common commercial policy to “foreign direct investment”
(Article 207.1 TFEU) confers exclusive competence on the European Union also in
this area. Much, however, argues in favour of assuming that the term “foreign
direct investment” only encompasses investment which serves to obtain a
controlling interest in an enterprise […]. The consequence of this would be that
exclusive competence only exists for investment of this type whereas investment
protection agreements that go beyond this would have to be concluded as mixed
agreements.”130
The Member State opposition to the Commission’s far-reaching competence claims
also found its way into the Council’s view. In its October 2012 Conclusions131 commenting
on the Commission’s plans, the Council is less explicit, but it clearly stressed that the
scope of the EU’s exclusive CCP power related to FDI,132 and admonished the
Commission that the future broad investment policy covering all kinds of investment

127.
128.
129.
130.

2010 Communication, supra note 19, at 8.
Commission Proposal 2012, supra note 20, at 3.
Commission Proposal 2012, supra note 20, at 3.
Lisbon Treaty judgment, German Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08,(June 30 2009), para. 379,
available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.
html.
131. Council Conclusions, 3041st Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, supra note 31.
132. Council Conclusions, 3041st Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, supra note 31,para. 2
(“RECOGNIZING the importance of foreign direct investment within the scope of the EU
exclusive competence for the common commercial policy under Articles 3(1)(e) and 207 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;”).
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should be further elaborated “in full respect of the respective competences of the Union
and its Member States as defined by the Treaties.”133 A more explicit Council position can
be found in its negotiation directives to the Commission regarding Canada, India and
Singapore in which it requests the Commission to aim at including “into the investment
protection chapter of the agreement areas of mixed competence, such as portfolio
investment, […].”134
While these conflicting interpretations of the scope of the EU’s powers are easily
comprehensible from the perspective of the respective EU organ’s institutional interests,
the proper interpretation remains a difficult issue that has also received much academic
attention.135 The problem of the proper interpretation of the material scope of the EU’s
investment power is exacerbated by the lack of any meaningful drafting history of the
Lisbon Treaty (or for that matter of the identically worded Constitution Treaty).
A limiting interpretation is clearly supported by the wording of the TFEU. The
ordinary meaning of “foreign direct investment”, as used in Articles 206 and 207 TFEU,

133. Council Conclusions, 3041st Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, supra note 31, para. 7
(“ACKNOWLEDGING the importance of a comprehensive approach to shaping the future EU
international investment policy that does not discriminate between different types of investors
and their investments, SUPPORTS the definition of a broad scope for the new EU policy in this
field as suggested by the Commission, to be further elaborated in full respect of the respective
competences of the Union and its Member States as defined by the Treaties;”). See also Council
Conclusions, 3041st Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, supra note 31, para19 of the Council
conclusions (“LOOKS forward to the Commission developing further initiatives as well as to
working with the Commission and the European Parliament, through good cooperation and in full
respect of the attribution of competences defined by the Treaties, to set up a comprehensive
European international investment policy.”).
134. 2011 EU Negotiating Mandates, supra note 38.
135. See the debate in: EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, SPECIAL ISSUE:
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND EU LAW (Marc Bungenberg, et. al eds., 2011); EU AND
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS. OPEN QUESTIONS AND REMAINING CHALLENGES (Marc Bungenberg, et
al eds., 2013); as well as Markus Burgstaller, Vertical Allocation of Competences for Investment
Treaties in the European Union, in MULTILATERALISM AND REGIONALISM IN GLOBAL ECONOMIC
GOVERNANCE – TRADE, INVESTMENT AND FINANCE 125 (Junji Nakagawa ed., 2011); Marc
Bungenberg, Going Global? The EU Common Commercial Policy After Lisbon, EUR. Y.B. INT’L
ECON. L. 123 (2010); ANGELOS DIMOPOULOS, EU FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW (2011); Angelos
Dimopoulos, The Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon: Establishing Parallelism between
Internal and External Economic Relations? 4 CROATIAN Y.B. OF EUR. L. AND POL’Y 101 (2008);
Thomas Eilmansberger, Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 383
(2009); Ch. Hermann, Die Zukunft der mitgliedstaatlichen Investitionspolitik nach dem Vertrag
von Lissabon, 77 EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 207 (2010); Markus
Krajewski, External Trade Law and the Constitution Treaty: Towards a Federal and More
Democratic Common Commercial Policy?, 42 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 91 (2005); Pieter Jan Kujper,
Foreign Direct Investment: The First Test of the Lisbon Improvements in the Domain of Trade
Policy, 37 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 261 (2010); Federico Ortino & Piet Eeckhout,
Towards and EU Policy on Foreign Direct Investment, in EU LAW AFTER LISBON 312 (Andrea
Biondi et al. eds., 2011); Wenhua Shan and Sheng Zhang, The Treaty of Lisbon: Half Way toward
a Common Investment Policy, 21 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 1049 (2010); Christian Tietje, Die
Außenwirtschaftsverfassung der EU nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, 83 BEITRÄGE ZUM
TRANSNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (2009). See also the references in note 6.
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comprises investment to the exclusion of portfolio investment. While the precise
distinction and delimitation between FDI and portfolio may be difficult, a number of
internationally used reference points have been made available by the OECD,136 the
IMF,137 and also the EU has adopted secondary legislation on point.138
Prima facie, the Commission position is certainly more difficult to defend. Why should
the new CCP power encompass portfolio investment when only FDI is explicitly
mentioned? Indeed, recognizing this textual obstacle the Commission suggests seeking
an implied competence and considers that such an implied external power results from
the express internal power of the EU to regulate the free movement of capital pursuant
to Article 64 TFEU.139 A closer look at the established EU doctrine of implied powers
shows that the expansive interpretation given by the ECJ140 and codified in the TFEU141

136. BENCHMARK DEFINITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT para. 11 (OECD., 4th ed. 2010),,
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/50/40193734.pdf. (“11. Direct investment is a
category of cross-border investment made by a resident in one economy (the direct investor) with
the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise (the direct investment enterprise)
that is resident in an economy other than that of the direct investor. The motivation of the direct
investor is a strategic long-term relationship with the direct investment enterprise to ensure a
significant degree of influence by the direct investor in the management of the direct investment
enterprise. The “lasting interest” is evidenced when the direct investor owns at least 10% of the
voting power of the direct investment enterprise. Direct investment may also allow the direct
investor to gain access to the economy of the direct investment enterprise which it might
otherwise be unable to do. The objectives of direct investment are different from those of portfolio
investment whereby investors do not generally expect to influence the management of the
enterprise.”).
137. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MANUAL para. 362 (International Monetary Fund ed., 5th edition 1993),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/bop/BOPman.pdf. (“362. Reflecting the difference
noted previously, a direct investment enterprise is defined in this Manual as an incorporated or
unincorporated enterprise in which a direct investor, who is resident in another economy, owns 10
percent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power (for an incorporated enterprise) or the
equivalent (for an unincorporated enterprise). Direct investment enterprises comprise those
entities that are subsidiaries (a nonresident investor owns more than 50 percent), associates (an
investor own 50 percent or less) and branches (wholly or jointly owned unincorporated
enterprises) either directly or indirectly owned by the direct investor. [ . . . ].”).
138. Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty,
1988 O.J. (L 178) 5. (“Investments of all kinds by natural persons or commercial, industrial or
financial undertakings, and which serve to establish or to maintain lasting and direct links
between the person providing the capital and the entrepreneur to whom or the undertaking to
which the capital is made available in order to carry on an economic activity. This concept must
therefore be understood in its widest sense.”).
139. TFEU, supra note 2, art. 64(2) (“Whilst endeavouring to achieve the objective of free movement of
capital between Member States and third countries to the greatest extent possible and without
prejudice to the other Chapters of the Treaties, the European Parliament and the Council, acting
in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt the measures on the movement
of capital to or from third countries involving direct investment – including investment in real
estate – establishment, the provision of financial services or the admission of securities to capital
markets.”).
140. See the so-called ERTA Case, Case 22/70 Commission of the European Communities v. Council of
the European Communities, 1971 E.C.R. 263, in which the ECJ affirmed the implied powers
doctrine by stating that the authority to enter into international agreements “arises not only from
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is likely to be continued by the CJEU. In the field of investment this would make it
probable that, if called to rule on such issue, the Court would consider also portfolio
investment that can be regulated on the basis of Article 63142 and 64 TFEU to be covered
by the EU’s implied external powers.
The question is likely to remain a theoretical problem since in practice the Council
will not consent to a broad investment agreement suggested by the Commission without
Member States participation. Thus, the intended broad scope of investment protection143
will require close cooperation between the Commission and the Member States.

B. Should Future EU IIAs Protect All Forms of Investments?
Independent from the question of the allocation of treaty-making power for FDI
“plus/minus portfolio investment” is the policy question whether future EU or mixed
agreements covering investment should broadly cover all forms of investment or be more
selective. This question is linked to a debate often addressed by critics of the current
investment protection system who wish to differentiate between “useful,” “genuine,”
“legitimate” investments that should be attracted by special host state protection and
unwelcome forms of investment. This debate is related to the development impact
discussion which led many capital importing countries to adopt admission requirements
in order to screen useful investments and to disallow unwelcome investments.144 A

141.

142.
143.
144.

an express conferment by the Treaty but may equally flow implicitly from other provisions of the
Treaty, from the act of accession and from measures adopted within the framework of those
provisions, by the Community institutions.”; see also Opinion 2/91, Convention No. 170 of the
International Labour Organization, 1993 E.C.R. I-1061 (“Authority to enter into international
commitments may not only arise from an express attribution by the Treaty, but may also flow
implicitly from its provisions [ . . . ] whenever Community law created for the institutions of the
Community powers within its internal system for the purpose of attaining a specific objective, the
Community had authority to enter into the international commitments necessary for the
attainment of that objective even in the absence of an express provision in that connection.”).
TFEU, supra note 2, art. 216(1) (“The Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third
countries or international organisations where the Treaties so provide or where the conclusion of
an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union’s policies, one of
the objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act or is
likely to affect common rules or alter their scope.”).
TFEU, supra note 2, art. 63(1) (“Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter,
all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and between Member States
and third countries shall be prohibited.”).
See 2010 Commission Communication, supra note 19, at 2-4; see also 2011 EU Negotiating
Mandates, supra note 38 (under “Scope”).
The economic dimension of territorial sovereignty entails the right of each government to decide
whether to admit foreign investments or not and, consequently, to adopt policy measures. In
general, there are some concerns against a full liberalization of national economies such as weak
domestic industries being eliminated or social problems caused by a rapid change of the economy.
In order to encounter these issues, there are various regulatory approaches in existing treaties.
Typical treaty models of admission contain, e.g., “performance requirements”, according to which
the host state imposes obligations on the investor to conduct his business in a certain manner

141

12 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 111 (2013)

similar effect was intended by so-called performance requirements; however, due to the
fact that most IIAs and in particular trade treaties consider performance requirements to
be distortive of competition, they are generally less and less used.145
Today, such concerns have been taken up by the EU Parliament through calls for
limiting investment protection to “non-speculative” investments. However, uncertainty
stems from the fact that the Parliament has expressly called for the exclusion of
“speculative forms of investment.”146 In practice, it would appear difficult to distinguish
between “speculative” and “non-speculative” portfolio (or even direct) investment.
Neither the Parliament nor any other EU institution has offered any precise definition of
“non-speculative” investments that should enjoy future IIA protection, though the
Parliament specifically requested that the Commission provide a clear definition of what
kind of investments should be protected.147 In its reaction, the Commission pointed
towards the difficulty of such a distinction and stressed that “speculative” investment
should not be equated with portfolio investment.148 It also suggested that speculative
forms of investment would not be protected by future investment agreements because

145.

146.

147.
148.
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such as the obligation to use local materials, the duty to export a certain amount of product or the
requirement to hire a certain number of locals. On the admission of FDIs in detail, see THOMAS
POLAN, LEGAL ADMISSION OF FDI (2006). Other treaties require that the investment is made “in
accordance with the laws” to the host state, which implies that investments violating domestic
law, i.e. the rules on admission and establishment, as well as other domestic rules such as
provisions relating to corruption, are not covered by the treaty. See infra note 155.
Developed countries are rather skeptical about the effectiveness of performance requirements,
as they constitute interventionist strategies of the past. However, the decline of BITs
featuring performance requirements in both developed and developing countries has happened
for various reasons. First of all, international obligations, for example the WTO TRIMs
Agreement, obliged governments to phase out certain types of performance requirements.
Secondly, many countries had to change their investment policy due to their accession to trade
regimes that involve the harmonization of trade and investment policies across Member
States, such as the EU or NAFTA. Thirdly, there has undoubtedly been a competition for FDI
inflows which has led to many countries liberalizing their FDI policy; see UNCTAD, FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS: NEW EVIDENCE FROM SELECTED
COUNTRIES, 18-20 (2003). The use of performance requirement clauses has prominently been
prohibited by BITs concluded by the US (see, e.g., Article 8 of both the 2004 and 2012 U.S.
Model BITs . U.S. Model BIT 2004, supra note 94, art. 8. U.S. Model BIT 2012 art. 8, 2012,
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf) or, on a
North-American level, by way of NAFTA, supra note 58, art. 1106.
See Resolution on future European international investment policy, supra note 32, para. 11 (“Asks
the Commission to provide a clear definition of the investments to be protected, including both
FDI and portfolio investment; considers, however, that speculative forms of investment, as defined
by the Commission, shall not be protected; insists that where intellectual property rights are
included in the scope of the investment agreement, including these agreements where draft
mandates have already been proposed, the provisions should avoid negatively impacting the
production of generic medicines and must respect the TRIPS exceptions for public health;”).
Resolution on future European international investment policy, supra note 32, para. 11.
Follow up to the European Parliament Resolution on the future European international investment
policy, supra note 34, at 3 (“Speculation has never been regarded as being synonymous to portfolio
investment.”).
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such agreements regularly do not protect “ordinary commercial transactions” and by
extension not “short term investments.”149
It is true that investment tribunals, both ICSID and non-ICSID panels, have
developed techniques to distinguish between “investments” and “ordinary commercial
transactions” with the effect that the latter would not fall under the protection of
investment tribunals. Though the precise limitation may be difficult, tribunals have
consistently held that purely commercial transactions such as sales contracts or the
acquisition of “receivables” from a private company do not qualify as investments.150
However, “ordinary commercial transactions” often are far from speculative
“transactions,” but rather relate to the payment for goods or services. Thus, the lack of
protection for “ordinary commercial transactions” does not imply that “short term
investments” or even “speculative” investments would be automatically excluded as a
result of the established jurisprudence of investment tribunals to exclude “ordinary
commercial transactions” from the notion of “investments.”
In the practice of investment protection, similar concerns about “unwelcome”
investments have been addressed in different ways. One approach of distinguishing
between welcome and unwelcome types of investment can be found in the discussion of
an implied “investment” notion under the ICSID Convention which clearly goes beyond
the mere differentiation between “investments” and “ordinary commercial
transactions”.151 ICSID jurisprudence has developed a test concerning the jurisdictional
requirement of an “investment” pursuant to Article 25 ICSID Convention and given
different weight, in particular, to the notion of a contribution to the host state
development.152 Since the Salini case, a certain contribution to the host state

149. Follow up to the European Parliament Resolution on the future European international investment
policy, supra note 34, at 2:
“[T]here would appear to be a misunderstanding that speculative forms of investment
would necessarily fall within the scope of protection of any future agreement, or that
such investments are currently protected under existing BITs. The raison d'être of the
special protection and guarantees included in BITs is founded on the nature of the
investment transaction as one which is clearly different from ordinary commercial
transactions, implying the contribution and commitment within the host state of
substantial resources for the longer term. BITs distinguish between investment and
ordinary commercial transactions for the purposes of protecting established investors
within the host state. [ . . . ] As far as the Commission is aware, up to now no tribunal
has ever decided upon a dispute arising out of a short term investment in the capital
market of the host state.”
150. See, e.g., Global Trading Resources Corp. and Globex International, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case
No. ARB/09/11, Award, ¶ 56 (Dec. 1, 2010) (“[P]urchase and sale contracts entered into by the
Claimants were pure commercial transactions and therefore cannot qualify as an investment for
the purposes of Article 25 of the Convention.”); Alps Finance v. Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL,
Award, (March 5, 2011), considering that a “mere one-off sale transaction” would not qualify as an
investment.
151. See supra text accompanying note 147.
152. See CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 128 (2nd ed. 2009).
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development figures prominently in ICSID case-law next to a certain duration, risk
participation and a certain total value contribution when it comes to define the unwritten
jurisdictional requirement of an “investment.”153
Similar to the non-written “contribution to the host state development” element, the
non-speculative character of an investment could be regarded as a jurisdictional
requirement in future EU IIAs – one that may even be expressly laid down in such
treaties. An explicit inscription of such a requirement would certainly avoid problems
along the line of the long-standing ICSID controversy whether this “contribution”
requirement is an intended part of the Article 25 notion of investment.154
However, as with the opaque notion of the “contribution” to the host state
development, there remains the problem of proper identification of non-speculative
investments. ICSID cases that have relied on the need to demonstrate a contribution to
the host state development have often taken rather subjective concepts when deciding
that the services of a law firm or the salvaging operations for historical ships do not
contribute to such development.155 While the underlying rationale may have been a crude
preference for green-field FDI, there is no clear explanation why the provision of legal
services or the development of aqua-touristic sites or museums should not contribute to
the development of host states.
Another technique to address concerns about “illegitimate” investments is the
limitation of investment protection to investment “in accordance with the law of the host
state.”156 A number of IIAs expressly contain such clauses and various investment

153. See Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (July 23, 2001) (“The doctrine generally considers that
investment infers: contributions, a certain duration of performance of the contract and a
participation in the risks of the transaction [ . . . ]. In reading the Convention’s preamble, one may
add the contribution to the economic development of the host State of the investment as an
additional condition.”).
154. While the annulment committee in Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID
Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Award, (Nov. 1, 2006), as
well as the sole arbitrator in Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. Malaysia, ICSID Case
No. ARB/05/10, Award on Jurisdiction (May 17, 2007), regarded the lack of “contribution” crucial
for denying jurisdiction, the tribunal in Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/20, Award, ¶ 111 (July 14, 2010), rejected the requirement of a “contribution to the host
States development.” (“[ . . . ] while the preamble refers to the “need for international cooperation
for economic development,” it would be excessive to attribute to this reference a meaning and
function that is not obviously apparent from its wording. In the Tribunal’s opinion, while the
economic development of a host State is one of the proclaimed objectives of the ICSID Convention,
this objective is not in and of itself an independent criterion for the definition of an investment.”).
155. See Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on
the Application for Annulment of the Award, (Nov. 1, 2006), and Malaysian Historical Salvors,
SDN, BHD v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Award on Jurisdiction (May 17, 2007).
156. See Andrea Carlevaris, The Conformity of Investments with the Law of the Host State and the
Jurisdiction of International Tribunals, 9 J. OF WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 35 (2008); Christina
Knahr, Investments “in accordance with host state law”, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW IN
CONTEXT 27 (August Reinisch & Christina Knahr eds., 2008); Ursula Kriebaum, Illegal
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tribunals have held that they lacked jurisdiction over claims concerning investments not
made “in accordance with the law of the host state.”157 For instance, already in 2001, the
ICSID tribunal in Salini v. Morocco158 had found that such a BIT clause excluded from
its protection illegal investments and in 2006, the tribunals in Inceysa v. El Salvador159
and Fraport v. Philippines160 reiterated this view and denied their jurisdiction on the
basis of such clauses because the investors had fraudulently and thus illegally procured
their investment. However, such cases have introduced a considerable level of
uncertainty since they fail to draw a clear line as to what degree of “illegality” is required
to deprive investors of investment protection.161 A further complication stems from recent
ICSID cases that have incorporated the “in accordance with the law of the host state”
requirement into the general notion of “investment”162 pursuant to Article 25 ICSID
Convention.163
Similarly, practical problems are likely to arise should the EU adopt such plans to
carve out “speculative” investments from the broad and all-encompassing investment

157.

158.
159.
160.
161.

162.
163.

Investments, 2010 AUSTRIAN Y.B. ON INT’L ARB. 307; Stephan Schill, Illegal Investments in
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 11 LAW & PRAC. OF INT’L CTS & TRIBUNALS 281 (2012).
See, e.g., Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Ghana for the
encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments art. 10 (Feb. 24, 1995), German Federal
Law Gazette II 1997/48 at 2055, [hereinafter Germany-Ghana BIT] (“This Treaty shall also apply
to investments made prior to its entry into force by nationals or companies of either Contracting
Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party consistent with the latter’s legislation.”) In a
case based on this BIT, the tribunal held that the investment must have been in accordance with
host state law at the initiation of an investment, i.e. when it is “made”; otherwise it would lack
jurisdiction. See Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/24, Award, ¶ 127 (June 18, 2010).
Salini Construttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4,
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 46 (July 23, 2001).
Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, ¶ 190
(Aug. 2 2006).
Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25,
Award (Aug. 16, 2007). See, however, the annulment decision of December 23, 2010.
See, however, Desert Line Projects LLC v. Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17, Award, ¶ 106 (Feb.
6, 2008), in which the tribunal suggested that only material violations should have the effect of
depriving investors of the protection by an investment tribunal. (“As far as concerns the issue of
the certificate, the threshold inquiry is whether Article 1(1) corresponds to mere formalism or to
some material objective. The Arbitral Tribunal has no hesitation in opting for the second
alternative. A purely formal requirement would by definition advance no real interest of either
signatory State; to the contrary, it would constitute an artificial trap depriving investors of the
very protection the BIT was intended to provide. [ . . . ]”). See also August Reinisch, From Novel
Personal Jurisdiction Issues to Considerable Substance on Fair and Equitable Treatment—ICSID
Arbitration in 2008, in THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY. YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE 2009, 749 (2010).
See supra text at note 151.
In Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, ¶ 114 (April 15,
2009), the tribunal suggested to take into account, in addition to the Salini criteria, “assets
invested in accordance with the laws of the host State” as well as “assets invested bona fide.” This
view was confirmed by the tribunal in Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Republic of
Ghana, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, Award, ¶ 123 (June 18, 2010).
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definition. The uncertainty surrounding the proper notion of “investment” was clearly
damaging for ICSID and may in the long run deter investors from using ICSID, relying
on UNCITRAL164 or other investment arbitration rules instead which do not have such a
requirement. In a similar way, uncertainty about the exact scope of protected investment
could be damaging for future EU IIAs because it might insert a considerable degree of
unpredictability as to the jurisdictional threshold to be overcome in order to hear a
dispute on the merits.

C. The Integration of Broader, Non-Economic Concerns Into Future
EU IIAs
The emergence of effective investment protection since the late 1990s primarily
through the availability of effective ISDS has led to a growing uneasiness among many
host states, including some EU Member States, fearing that too effective investment
protection may become too costly and ultimately deter from adopting legitimate policy
measures.165 This true or perceived danger of a so-called regulatory chill166 has led to
outright denunciation of the current system167 and (even in OECD countries) attempts to
moderate investment protection by balancing investor concerns with governmental
interests.168

164. See White Industries Australia Limited v. India, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 7.4.9 (Nov. 30,
2011), (“The present case, however, is not subject to the ICSID Convention. Consequently, the socalled Salini Test and [ . . . ] are simply not applicable here.”). One must be aware, however, that
there are recent UNCITRAL cases like Alps Finance v. Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, Award,
(March 5, 2011), which have expressly required the Salini criteria in order to qualify an
investment as protected investment held that a “mere one-off sale transaction” would not qualify
as an investment.
165. See GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007). For a more
nuanced view, see the contributions in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:
PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010).
166. See STEPHEN WOOLCOCK, THE EU APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POLICY AFTER THE
LISBON TREATY, Study for the EP Committee on International Trade 46 (2010).
167. In 2007, Bolivia was the first State to denounce the ICSID Convention, followed by Ecuador in
2009 and, most recently, by Venezuela in January 2012. The ICSID Convention regulates the
withdrawal of States Parties in Articles 71 and 72. See Christoph Schreuer, Denunciation of the
ICSID Convention and Consent to Arbitration, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 353 (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010); Oscar M.
Garibaldi, On the Denunciation of the ICSID Convention, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 251 (Christina Binder, et al.
eds., 2009); Keyvan Rastegar, Denouncing ICSID, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE
21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 278 (Christina Binder, et al. eds.,
2009).
168. Cf. the attempts of the US and Canada to draft more balanced expropriation provisions in their
2004 Model BITs. Canadian Model FIPA, supra note 58 and US Model BIT 2004, supra note 94.
See infra notes 174 and 175 See also the Norwegian Draft Model BIT, 2007, available at
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1391, which included an express provision on the
“right to regulate” (Draft Article [12]: “Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a
Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this
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EU institutions have also picked up these anxieties. In its 2010 Communication, the
Commission stated with regard to the potential breadth of indirect expropriation that “[a]
clear formulation of the balance between the different interests at stake, such as the
protection of investors against unlawful expropriation or the right of each Party to
regulate in the public interest, needs to be ensured.”169 It further stated that “Investment
agreements should be consistent with the other policies of the Union and its Member
States, including policies on the protection of the environment, decent work, health and
safety at work, consumer protection, cultural diversity, development policy and
competition policy.”170 These concerns are shared in principle by the Council,
admonishing in its Negotiating Directives with Canada, India, and Singapore the need to
guarantee an appropriate regulatory space for the EU and its Member States by
cautioning that an EU investment agreement “shall be without prejudice to the right of
the EU and the Member States to adopt and enforce, in accordance with their respective
competences, measures necessary to pursue legitimate public policy objectives such as
social, environmental, security, public health and safety in a non-discriminatory
manner.”171
Such language is reminiscent of the police powers doctrine,172 as endorsed by some
investment tribunals173 and found in the explanatory parts of US174 and Canadian175
Model BITs. It will leave considerable leeway for treaty negotiators to draft the

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

174.

175.

Agreement that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity is undertaken in a
manner sensitive to health, safety or environmental concerns.”).
2010 Commission Communication, supra note 19, at 9.
2010 Commission Communication, supra note 19, at 9.
2011 EU Negotiating Mandates, supra note 38.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 cmt. g,
at 201 (“[ . . . ] action of the kind that is commonly accepted as within the police power of states.”).
See, e.g., Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ARB(AF)/00/2,
Award, ¶ 119 (May 29, 2003), (“The principle that the State’s exercise of its sovereign powers
within the framework of its police power may cause economic damage to those subject to its
powers as administrator without entitling them to any compensation whatsoever is
undisputable.”); Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL
Partial Award, ¶ 262 (March 17, 2006) (“[ . . . ] the principle that a State does not commit an
expropriation and is thus not liable to pay compensation to a dispossessed alien investor when it
adopts general regulations that are “commonly accepted as within the police power of States”
forms part of customary international law today.”)
See Annex B on Expropriation 4(b) in U.S. Model BIT 2004, supra note 94, annex b (“Except in
rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and
applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations.”).
See Annex B.13(1) on Expropriation in Canadian Model FIPA, supra note 58, annex b.13(1)
(“Except in rare circumstances, such as when a measure or series of measures are so severe in the
light of their purpose that they cannot be reasonably viewed as having been adopted and applied
in good faith, non-discriminatory measures of a Party that are designed and applied to protect
legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the environment, do not constitute
indirect expropriation.”)
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respective treatment standards and possible exception clauses. These concerns were even
reinforced by the European Parliament which expressed its irritation with the regulatory
chill of investment arbitration176 and specifically called upon the Commission “to include
in all future agreements specific clauses laying down the right of parties to the
agreement to regulate, inter alia, in the areas of protection of national security, the
environment, public health, workers’ and consumers’ rights, industrial policy and
cultural diversity.”177 In its response, the Commission pointed to the EU’s practice to
include a general right to regulate in its FTAs and that it intended to continue this
practice in its negotiations.178
While finding the proper balance between investment and non-investment interests
will indeed be one of the core issues for future EU IIAs,179 it is questionable whether the
incorporation of standard clauses preserving the contracting states’ right to regulate will
accomplish that goal. At present there is not yet sufficient practice to determine how
investment tribunals would interpret such general clauses in order to assess whether the
intended effect can be achieved.

D. The Impact on Intra-EU-BITs
An issue related to the question of the effect of the transfer of IIA powers on existing
Member State BITs with third countries is the question whether the new investment
competence of the EU implies that BITs concluded among Member States, so-called
intra-EU-BITs, have become incompatible with EU law and whether such potential
incompatibility implies their automatic termination or requires that they be terminated
by the Member States.180
176. Resolution on future European international investment policy, supra note 32, para. G (“[ . . . ] a
number of problems became clear because of the use of vague language in agreements being left
open for interpretation, particularly concerning the possibility of conflict between private interests
and the regulatory tasks of public authorities, for example in cases where the adoption of
legitimate legislation led to a state being condemned by international arbitrators for a breach of
the principle of ‘fair and equitable treatment’.”).
177. Resolution on future European international investment policy, supra note 32, para. 25.
178. Follow up to the European Parliament Resolution on the future European international investment
policy, supra note 34, at 5 (“[T]he inclusion [ . . . ] of specific clauses laying down the right [ . . . ] to
regulate (inter alia, in the areas of protection of national security, the environment, public health,
workers’ and consumers’ rights, industrial policy and cultural diversity) is largely consistent with
the current practice of the EU, which includes a similar statement in the general part of all its
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) in order to cover not only investment, but all other disciplines as
well. To the extent that investment protection Chapters will be part of a FTA, this general
affirmation will also apply to them, and will be replicated in any investment protection
agreement.”).
179. See Lars Markert, The Crucial Question of Future Investment Treaties: Balancing Investors’
Rights and Regulatory Interests of Host States, EUR. Y.B. INT’L ECON. L., SPECIAL ISSUE: INT’L
INVESTMENT LAW AND EU LAW 145 (2011); Jan Kleinheisterkamp, European Policy Space in
International Investment Law, 27 ICSID REVIEW FOREIGN INVESTMENT L. J. 416 (2012).
180. See L. Aroulai & W. Ben Hamida, La Protection des Investissements par le Droit Primaire – Droit
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In the course of a number of investment arbitrations, some Member States (in their
role as respondents) have in fact asserted that the incompatibility between intra-EUBITs and EU law would lead to the formers’ automatic termination.181 The Commission
has been slightly more cautious by asserting that such incompatibility would not lead to
an automatic termination, but rather require the Member States to terminate their
intra-EU-BITs.182
Investment tribunals have generally rejected the claim that intra-EU-BITs EU law
would be incompatible as matter of treaty law. As a result they have usually upheld their
jurisdiction based on the continued validity of intra-EU-BITs. The Eastern Sugar
tribunal rejected the argument that the alleged incompatibility would have led to an
automatic treaty termination pursuant to Article 59 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (VCLT),183 holding that the Czech Republic/Netherlands BIT and EU law did
“not cover the same precise subject-matter.”184 Similarly, the tribunal in Eureko v.

181.
182.

183.

184.

Conventionnel des Investissements et Droit Primaire Communautaire: Étude compare des régimes
et des approches,LE DROIT EUROPÉEN ET L’INVESTISSEMENT 69 (2009); Markus Burgstaller, The
Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties of EU Member States, in INTERNATIONALER
INVESTITIONSSCHUTZ UND EUROPARECHT 113 (Marc Bungenberg, et al. eds., 2010); Steffan
Hindelang, Member State BITs-There’s Still (Some) Life in the Old Dog Yet, Y.B. INT’L
INVESTMENT L. & POL’Y 2010/2011 217 (2011); Michele Potesta, Bilateral Investment Treaties and
the European Union recent Developments in Arbitration and before the ECJ, 8 THE LAW AND PRAC.
OF INT’L CTS & TRIBUNALS 225 (2009); August Reinisch, Articles 30 and 59 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties in Action – The Decisions on Jurisdiction in the Eastern Sugar
and Eureko Investment Arbitrations, 39(2) LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 157 (2012);
Christer Söderlund, Intra-EU BIT Investment Protection and the EC Treaty, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 455
(2007); Christian Tietje, Bilaterale Investitionsschutzverträge zwischen EU-Mitgliedstaaten (IntraEU-BITs) als Herausforderung im Mehrebenensystem des Rechts, 2 KÖLNER SCHRIFTEN ZUM
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 128 (2011); Robert Volterra, Le Point de Vue des Ètats Tiers, in LE DROIT
EUROPÉEN ET L’INVESTISSEMENT 41 (Catherine Kessedjian & Charles Leben eds., 2009); Hanno
Wehland, Intra-EU Investment Agreements and Arbitration: Is European Community Law an
Obstacle?, 58 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 297 (2009); Marek Wierzbowski & Aleksander Gubrynowicz,
Conflict of Norms Stemming from Intra-EU BITs and EU Legal Obligations: Some Remarks on
Possible Solutions, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 544 (Christina Binder, et al. eds., 2009).
See, e.g., the position of the Czech Republic summarized in Eastern Sugar v. Czech Republic, SCC
Case No 088/2004, Partial Award, ¶ 97 (March 27, 2007).
See EC Letter of January 13, 2006, quoted in Eastern Sugar v. Czech Republic, SCC Case No
088/2004, Partial Award, ¶ 19 (March 27, 2007); European Commission Observations, July 7,
2010, (cited in Eureko BV v. The Slovak Republic, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and
Suspension, ¶ 180 (Oct. 26, 2010)).
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 59(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT] (“A
treaty shall be considered as terminated if all the parties to it conclude a later treaty relating to
the same subject matter and: (a) it appears from the later treaty or is otherwise established that
the parties intended that the matter should be governed by that treaty; or (b) the provisions of the
later treaty are so far incompatible with those of the earlier one that the two treaties are not
capable of being applied at the same time.”).
Eastern Sugar v. Czech Republic, Eastern Sugar BV v. Czech Republic, SCC Case No 088/2004,
Partial Award, ¶ 160, (March 27, 2007).
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Slovakia185 dismissed the “intra-EU jurisdictional objection”, holding that the BIT
provisions have “not been displaced by EU law” as a result of Article 59 VCLT,186 nor
have they been “disapplied by EU law” as a result of Article 30 VCLT.187
The issue may of course be largely a question of perspective. From an EU law
perspective, the incompatibility may stem, for instance, from the fact that intra-EU-BITs
grant nationals of specific EU Member States procedural rights like ISDS that would not
be available to other EU nationals and thus lead to discrimination.188 Under accepted EU
principles like supremacy and primacy, it would clearly follow that any inconsistence
between EU law and national law must lead to a “disapplication” of national law.189 In
the opinion of the Commission this overriding effect also applies vis-à-vis treaties
concluded by Member States.190

185. Eureko BV v. The Slovak Republic, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension (Oct. 26
2010).
186. Id. ¶ 265.
187. Id. ¶ 277. VCLT, supra note 183, art. 30:
“1. Subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the rights and
obligations of States parties to successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter
shall be determined in accordance with the following paragraphs.
2. When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as
incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail.
3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the
earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under article 59, the earlier
treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the
later treaty. [ . . . ].”
188. Eureko BV v. The Slovak Republic, ¶ 183, quoting the European Commission Observations, July
7, 2010.
189. The doctrine of “supremacy” or “primacy” of EC/EU law was developed by the ECJ in the Van
Gend Case, insisting that Community law stands for an autonomous legal order which required
not only direct effect but also that – in case of conflict between a directly applicable Community
law norm and a norm of the national legal order – the Community law norm would have to be
applied. See Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963
E.C.R. 1 (“[ . . . ] the integration into the laws of each Member State of provisions which derive
from the Community, and more generally the terms and the spirit of the Treaty, make it
impossible for the States, as a corollary, to accord precedence to a unilateral and subsequent
measure over a legal system accepted by them on a basis of reciprocity.”).
190. European Commission Observations, July 7, 2010 (cited in Eureko BV v. The Slovak Republic, ¶
180: “[A]s a result of the supremacy of EU law vis-à-vis pre-accession treaties between Member
States, conflicts between BIT provisions and EU law cannot be resolved by interpreting and
applying the relevant EU law provisions in the light of the BIT. Only the inverse approach is
possible, namely interpretation of the BIT norms in the light of EU law. The foregoing has
implications as regards the ability of private parties (investors) to rely on provisions of an intraEU BIT that are in conflict with EU law. Under EU law, a private party cannot rely on provisions
in an international agreement to justify a possible breach of EU law. This includes resort to
judicial settlement mechanisms that conflict with the EU judicial system. Furthermore, in the EU
legal system, national legislation of an EU Member State that is incompatible with EU law does
not become ‘invalid’; it merely cannot be applied where it conflicts with EU law. The same applies
in the Commission’s view, to existing intra-EU BITs that contain provisions that are incompatible
with EU law: neither the BIT as such nor the conflicting provisions become ‘invalid’; but they
cannot be applied where they conflict with EU law.”
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From the perspective of international law, any potential incompatibility between
intra-EU-BITs and EU law must be assessed on the basis of treaty law rules concerning
successive treaty obligations. Thus, investment tribunals have assessed such
incompatibility arguments on the basis of the rules on successive treaties codified in
Articles 30 and 59 VCLT.191 On this basis, the fact that intra-EU-BITs may provide
investors with different or more rights than EU law does not necessarily mean that these
two systems are incompatible.192 Even the fact that procedural rights like access to ISDS
may be discriminatorily available only to some EU nationals as a result of an intra-EUBIT does not imply that the two treaties are incompatible.193
In spite of, or maybe because of, the predominantly positive attitude of investment
tribunals towards the continued validity of intra-EU-BITs, the Commission continues to
pressure EU Member States to terminate them.194

E. Compatibility of ISDS with the System of Legal Protection by the
Court of Justice of the EU
Also the debate concerning ISDS has shifted quite remarkably. While at first it
seemed uncertain whether the EU institutions would espouse the concept of ISDS as
such or rather go for the Calvo-inspired, Australia-US BIT approach to abandon it
outright and to rely exclusively on domestic courts,195 the gradual endorsement of ISDS

191. See in detail August Reinisch, Articles 30 and 59 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
in Action – The Decisions on Jurisdiction in the Eastern Sugar and Eureko Investment
Arbitrations, 39(2) LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 157 (2012).
192. Eureko BV v. The Slovak Republic, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, ¶ 263
(Oct. 26, 2010) (“Nor can it be said that the provisions of the BIT are incompatible with EU law.
The rights to fair and equitable treatment, to full protection and security, and to protection
against expropriation at least, extend beyond the protections afforded by EU law; and there is no
reason why those rights should not be fulfilled and upheld in addition to the rights protected by
EU law.”).
193. Eastern Sugar v. Czech Republic, ¶ 170 (“If the EU Treaty gives more rights than does the BIT,
then all EU Parties, including the Netherlands and Dutch investors, may claim those rights. If the
BIT gives rights to the Netherlands and to Dutch investors that it does not give to other EU
countries and investors, it will be for those other countries and investors to claim their equal
rights. But the fact that these rights are unequal does not make them incompatible.”).
194. See, e.g., Report by Luke Peterson, http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20101023_10 (available by
subscription or purchase), according to which the EU Commission informed the Member States
that certain intra-EU-BITs must be terminated. On an earlier occasion, the Commission explicitly
stated in its submission in Eureko BV v. The Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award on
Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, ¶ 182 (Oct. 26, 2010), that “[e]ventually, all intra-EU
BITs will have to be terminated.”
195. The Australia-United States FTA (2005) totally abolishes investor-state arbitration. While this
has been a feature in North-North BITs, the Australian Government has announced that it would
generally abstain from including ISDS provisions in future BITs. See AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT,
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, GILLARD GOVERNMENT TRADE POLICY STATEMENT:
TRADING
OUR
WAY
TO
MORE
JOBS
AND
PROSPERITY
1,
14
(2011),
http://pdf.aigroup.asn.au/trade/Gillard%20Trade%20Policy%20Statement.pdf. See also L. Nottage,
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by the Commission and the Council and, subsequently though less enthusiastically, also
by the Parliament led to questions concerning the necessary adaptations to account for
the fact that the EU is not a state, but rather a highly integrated supranational
organization. In particular more technical issues concerning the potential accessibility of
ICSID have been raised and remain unresolved.196
An issue that has received much less attention by the EU institutions is the question
of the general compatibility of ISDS with the system of legal protection guaranteed by
the CJEU.197 Concern has been voiced that the Court of Justice may regard any
“competing” dispute settlement institution as an “unconstitutional” threat to the
autonomy of EU law and its own exclusive power to interpret it.198
These concerns stem from a line of ECJ cases that have vigilantly safeguarded the
spheres of exclusive jurisdiction enjoyed by the Court as the sole authentic interpreter of
Community, now Union law. The judicial autonomy claim is based on the EU’s
constituent treaty which in Article 344 TFEU provides not only for various forms of
exclusive competence of the CJEU, but also for an explicit prohibition for the Member
States to have their EU law related disputes settled by any other court or tribunal.199

196.
197.

198.
199.
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The Rise and Possible Fall of Investor-State Arbitration in Asia: A Skeptic’s View of Australia’s
“Gillard Government Trade Policy Statement”, 8(5) TRANSNATIONAL DISP. MGMT. (2011); Leon E.
Trakman, Investor State Arbitration or Local Courts: Will Australia Set a New Trend?, 46 J.
WORLD TRADE 83 (2012); William S. Dodge, Investor-State Dispute Settlement between Developed
Countries: Reflection on the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, 39 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (2006) 1-37.
See supra text accompanying note 105.
See M. Burgstaller, Investor-State Arbitration in EU International Investment Agreements with
Third States, 39 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 207 (2012); Markus Burgstaller, Les
Aspects procéduraux de l’Arbitrage – Qui est partie? Le role de la Commission Européenn?, in LE
DROIT EUROPÉEN ET L’INVESTISSEMENT 123 (Catherine Kessedjian & Charles Leben eds., 2009);
Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochère, Quel rôle pour la Cour de Justice?, in LE DROIT EUROPÉEN ET
L’ARBITRAGE D’INVESTISSEMENT/EUROPEAN LAW AND INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 37 (Catherine
Kessedjian ed., 2011); Steffan Hindelang, Der primärrechtliche Rahmen einer EUInvestitionsschutzpolitik: Zulässigkeit und Grenzen von Investor-Staat-Schiedsverfahren aufgrund
künftiger EU Abkommen, in DIE GEMEINSAME HANDELSPOLITIK DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION NACH
LISSABON” 157 (Marc Bungenberg & Christoph Herrmann eds., 2011); Steffan Hindelang,
Circumventing Primacy of EU Law and the CJEU’s Judicial Monopoly by Resorting to Dispute
Resolution Mechanisms Provided for in Inter-se Treaties? The Case of Intra-EU Investment
Arbitration, 39 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 179 (2012); Nikolaos Lavranos, Designing an
International Investor-to-State Arbitration System after Opinion 1/09, in COMMON COMMERCIAL
POLICY AFTER LISBON, SPECIAL ISSUE TO THE EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW 199 (Marc Bungenberg & Christoph Herrmann eds., 2013); Matthew Parish, International
Courts and the European Legal Order, 23 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 141 (2012) 141; Stephan Schill,
Luxembourg Limits: Conditions for Investor-State Dispute Settlement under Future EU Investment
Agreements, in EU AND INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: OPEN QUESTIONS AND REMAINING
CHALLENGES 37 (Marc Bungenberg, et al. eds., 2013).
Pursuant to TEU, supra note 29, art. 19(1), the Court has to “ensure that in the interpretation and
application of the Treaties the law is observed.”
TFEU, supra note 2, art. 344 (“Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the
interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided
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This latter prohibition played an important role in the so-called MOX Plant case200 in
which the Commission successfully brought infringement proceedings against Ireland
because the latter had instituted arbitral proceedings against the UK under the UN Law
of the Sea Convention.201 In the view of the ECJ, the Law of the Sea issues raised in that
arbitration came within the scope of Community competence and were thus part of a
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of Community law.202
Since both the MOX Plant case as well as Article 344 TFEU expressly refer to interstate disputes it is unlikely that investor-state arbitration would be regarded
incompatible with this form of exclusivity.203 However, from a broader perspective it
cannot be excluded that the CJEU might find fault in a system of ISDS regularly
provided for in future EU IIAs where such investor-state arbitration tribunals may deal
with questions of EU law. This could be the case if the Court followed an interpretation
given to the nature of investment arbitration as the procedural option for private parties
to enforce the international law claims of their home states.204 In order to understand the
background of such a possible curb on ISDS by the CJEU it is important to appreciate
the Court’s past case-law and position vis-à-vis its potential judicial competitors.
The first clear manifestation of this defensive stance can be found in the Court’s
Advisory Opinion on the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement205 which intended to
set up a parallel system of judicial protection covering both the then EC and EFTA states
joined in the EEA enterprise. While the ECJ found that the Community’s treaty-making
power in the field of an enlarged free trade agreement comprised also the power to agree
on binding dispute settlement,206 it considerably limited this position by holding that
such a dispute settlement institution would be prevented from ruling on issues

for therein.”).
200. Case C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland (Mox Plant), 2006 E.C.R. I-4635.
201. Ireland v. United Kingdom (“MOX Plant Case”), UNCLOS Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal, available
at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1148.
202. Case C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland (Mox Plant), 2006 E.C.R. I-4635, ¶¶ 125 - 184.
203. In the Eureko case, an investment tribunal rejected such an assertion by the respondent state
holding that the MOX Plant ruling was “concerned with disputes between the BIT Contracting
Parties, the ruling is not applicable to disputes under Article 8, which are not disputes between
Contracting Parties but investor-state disputes.” Eureko BV v. The Slovak Republic, supra note
185, ¶ 276.
204. See generally Zachary Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 74
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 151 (2003). See also Steffen Hindelang, Circumventing Primacy of EU Law,
supra note 197, at 200, arguing that such a position could lead to an incompatibility of ISDS with
TFEU, supra note 2, art. 344.
205. Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA), 1994 O.J. (L 1) 3.
206. Opinion 1/91, Economic Area Agreement I, 1991 E.C.R. I-6079, ¶ 40 (“An international agreement
providing for such a system of courts is in principle compatible with Community law. The
Community’s competence in the field of international relations and its capacity to conclude
international agreements necessarily entails the power to submit to the decisions of a court which
is created or designated by such an agreement as regards the interpretation and application of its
provisions.”).
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concerning the allocation of competences between the EC and its Member States207 which
fell under its own exclusive jurisdiction.208 This attitude was confirmed by the Court’s
Opinion on the establishment of a European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) equally
stressing the need for an autonomous EC legal order that would prevent an international
dispute settlement mechanism from rendering binding interpretations of EC law.209
More recently, in its Opinion on the European and Community Patents Courts210 the
Court of Justice reiterated its reserved position towards “foreign judges” who might rule
on EU law. With regard to the envisaged patent courts that would have had exclusive
jurisdiction to decide patent cases, the Court of Justice cautioned that such a system
would deprive it of the possibility to make preliminary rulings on requests from Member
State courts and would thus threaten the uniform interpretation and application of EU
law guaranteed by the Court.211 In other words, the Court of Justice appears to give
increasing weight to its own role as the guardian of the true interpretation of EU law
whether in direct actions or indirectly through the system of preliminary references. That
role is regarded threatened by “foreign” courts that do not submit to the CJEU’s ultimate
interpretive power.
The implications for ISDS are uncertain. It cannot be excluded that the CJEU would
consider investor-state arbitration incompatible with such a far-reaching interpretation

207. Id. ¶ 34 (“[ . . . ] when a dispute relating to the interpretation or application of one or more
provisions of the agreement is brought before it, the EEA Court may be called upon to interpret
the expression ‘Contracting Party’, within the meaning of Article 2(c) of the agreement, in order to
determine whether, for the purposes of the provision at issue, the expression ‘Contracting Party’
means the Community, the Community and the Member States, or simply the Member States.
Consequently, the EEA Court will have to rule on the respective competences of the Community
and the Member States as regards the matters governed by the provisions of the agreement.”).
208. Id. ¶ 35 (“[ . . . ] the jurisdiction conferred on the EEA Court under [the EEA Agreement] is likely
adversely to affect the allocation of responsibilities defined in the [EC] Treaties and, hence, the
autonomy of the Community legal order, respect for which must be assured by the Court of Justice
[ . . . ].”).
209. Opinion 1/00, European Common Aviation Area, 2002 E.C.R. I-3498, ¶¶ 12-13 (“[ . . . ] the
autonomy of the Community legal order [ . . . ] requires that the procedures for ensuring uniform
interpretation of the rules of the ECAA Agreement and for resolving disputes will not have the
effect of binding the Community and its institutions, in the exercise of their internal powers, to a
particular interpretation of the rules of Community law referred to in that agreement.”).
210. Opinion 1/09, European and Community Patents Courts, CJEU, 2011 E.C.R. I-01137.
211. Id. ¶ 89:
[T]he envisaged agreement, by conferring on an international court which is outside the
institutional and judicial framework of the European Union an exclusive jurisdiction to
hear a significant number of actions brought by individuals in the field of the
Community patent and to interpret and apply European Union law in that field, would
deprive courts of Member States of their powers in relation to the interpretation and
application of European Union law and the Court of its powers to reply, by preliminary
ruling, to questions referred by those courts and, consequently, would alter the essential
character of the powers which the Treaties confer in the institutions of the European
Union and on the Member States and which are indispensable to the preservation of
the very nature of European Union law.
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of its own interpretive prerogatives. The question appears to turn on the degree to which
investor-state arbitration tribunals are likely to interpret and apply EU law in the
future. One such crucial area is the question of the attribution of acts or omissions
causing harm to foreign investors that is relevant not only for the question who is likely
to be a respondent in ISDS proceedings, but also for the ultimate responsibility. In order
to decide such questions an investment tribunal would clearly “have to rule on the
respective competences of the [Union] and the Member States as regards the matters
governed by the provisions of the agreement.”212
It seems that a mechanism like the one adopted for the determination of the roles in
investment arbitration for purposes of the ECT213 would sufficiently safeguard the
required autonomy of the EU institutions. Where such issues concerning the internal
distribution of competences are insulated from the determination by ISDS, the autonomy
would seem to be guaranteed. Much more problematic appear cases where investor-state
arbitral tribunals may be called upon to directly apply EU law in the course of assessing
the claims of an investor. That is particularly likely if future EU IIAs contain applicable
law clauses214 that would not be limited to the treaty standards and possibly customary
international law,215 but rather encompass the law of the host state.216 In such a
situation investment tribunals may have to rule on EU law; this could be regarded as an
infringement of the exclusive power of the CJEU to interpret EU law. One possibility to
remedy such a potential incompatibility of ISDS with EU law is hinted to in the
European and Community Patents Courts Opinion where the CJEU seemed to suggest
that it was the non-availability of the preliminary reference proceeding by the planned
patent courts which caused the incompatibility.217

212. Opinion 1/91, Economic Area Agreement I, 1991 E.C.R. I-6079, ¶ 34, see supra, note 206.
213. Statement by the European Communities to the Secretariat (1998). supra text accompanying note
104.
214. Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi, The Meaning of “and” in Article 42(1), Second Sentence, of
the Washington Convention: The Role of International Law in the ICSID Choice of Law Process, 18
ICSID REV. —FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 375 (2003); Antonio R. Parra, Applicable Substantive
Law in ICSID Arbitrations Initiated under Investment Treaties, 16 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN
INVESTMENT L. J. 30 (2001); Giorgio Sacerdoti, Investment Arbitration Under ICSID and
UNCITRAL Rules: Prerequisites, Applicable Law, Review of Awards, 19 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN
INVESTMENT L. J. 1 (2004).
215. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 58, art. 1131(1) (“A Tribunal established under this Section shall
decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Agreement and applicable rules of
international law.”).
216. See, e.g., Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between the
Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Argentine Republic, art. 10(7), Oct. 20, 1992, 2233 U.N.T.S.
168 (“The arbitration tribunal addressed in accordance with paragraph (5) of this Article shall
decide on the basis of the law of the Contracting Party which is a party to the dispute (including
its rules on the conflict of law), the provisions of the present Agreement, special Agreements
concluded in relation to the investment concerned as well as such rules of international law as
may be applicable.”).
217. See supra note 210.
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One could thus presume that as long as the envisaged dispute settlement mechanism
offered a possibility to allow preliminary references, it should be viewed as compatible
with the CJEU’s claim to have the final word on the interpretation of EU law. But apart
from the question whether the EU’s future IIA partners would agree to such a possibility,
a practical problem seems to stem from another line of CJEU jurisprudence. In the past,
the Court has consistently given a rather narrow interpretation to the notion of a
“tribunal” which according to Article 267 TFEU is entitled to request a preliminary
ruling.218 According to the CJEU’s case law, such bodies must exercise public authority
on behalf of Member States and possess independent judicial tasks.219
Since the Nordsee case,220 the Court has held that commercial arbitration tribunals
are a form of private and not state dispute settlement and thus do not qualify as
“tribunals” entitled to request preliminary rulings. While it is not excluded to view mixed
investor-state arbitration as different from purely private arbitration, it may still be
difficult to see the required link to a Member State,221 though it has been suggested that
one could regard treaty-based arbitration as arbitration being based on national law.222
Thus, any suggestions to remedy the uncertain situation by “upgrading”223 investor-state
tribunals to “tribunals” entitled to make preliminary references in order to make the
system of ISDS compatible with EU law remain fraught with difficulties.

VII.Conclusions
After initial concerns about the EU’s investment policy to be carried out by the
Commission, which were fuelled by the latter’s reluctance to take clear positions on a
wide range of crucial issues, it now appears that, three years after the entry-into-force of
the Lisbon Treaty, some contours of future EU IIAs are beginning to emerge, seemingly
also still recognizable as “European.” It is to be expected that future EU IIAs will largely
resemble the typical BITs concluded by its Member States, though there may be a few
additions in particular in the field of ensuring sufficient regulatory space for host states
and addressing some recent concerns surrounding ISDS.
218. According to TFEU, supra note 2, art. 267(2) (ex-Article 234(2) TEC) “any court or tribunal of a
Member State” may request a preliminary ruling.
219. In Case 246/80, Broekmeulen v. Huisarts Registratie Commissie, 1981 E.C.R. 2311, the Dutch
Appeals Committee for General Medicine was recognised as a ‘tribunal’ because it operated with
the consent and cooperation of public authorities, used adversarial procedures and delivered final
decisions. In addition to these characteristics, general establishment by law, permanency,
compulsory jurisdiction, inter partes procedure, independence and applying rules of law, are seen
as criteria to be evaluated when determining whether a decision-making body qualifies as a ‘court
or tribunal’ enabled to ask for a preliminary ruling.
220. Case 102/81, Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei, 1982 E.C.R. 1095.
221. TFEU, supra note 2, art. 267(2) speaks of “any court or tribunal of a Member State.”
222. See, e.g., Hindelang, Circumventing Primacy of EU Law, supra note 180, at 202.
223. One may also view that as a “downgrading” since international tribunals would thereby be
equated to courts or tribunals of Member States.
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However, there still remain a number of open questions: Will the EU alone be
competent to conclude IIAs covering both FDI and portfolio investment? Is it possible and
is it in the interest of the EU to protect only certain kinds of investment? What will
happen to intra-EU-BITs? Will the CJEU accept a system of ISDS that may have
implications on the interpretation and application of EU law? While many of these
questions will have to be addressed in the current effort to shape a future EU investment
policy it is likely that the final word will come from the CJEU . . . and that maybe only in
a few years.
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